Introduction * Part 1 * Part 2 * Part 3 * Part 4 * Part 5
This entry represents Part 3 of a comprehensive report on the talks I attended at the Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights conference presented by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. The narrative presented here represents my own personal observations and interpretations of the event and the subject matter discussed therein, and I encourage anyone who reads this who was also in attendance to note any factual errors I may have made and to offer any criticisms of my responses that seem merited.
3:00 - 4:30 PM - Equity, Technology and State Power
This was a panel moderated by Dr. Anders Sandberg. Panel members were Fred Gifford, Ph.D. whose talk was entitled "Ethical Issues in Enhancement Research", Robert Schwartz, J.D., who discussed "The Medicalization of Body Modification and the Ethical Obligations of Health Care Providers", Laura Colleton, J.D. whose presentation explored "Health Care Access in the U.S. and the Elusive Line between Enhancement and Therapy", and a duo -- Nikki Sullivan, Ph.D. and Susan Stryker, Ph.D. -- who delivered "King's Body, Queen's Member: State Sovereignty, Transsexual Surgery, and Self-Demand Amputation".
Dr. Gifford's presentation seemed a bit rushed (he seemed to have packed more information into his PowerPoint slides than was really possible to go into depth about in the allotted timespan), but nevertheless, the talk was well-structured and I was able to get a decent understanding of the ethical issues raised. Dr. Gifford's was one of the few (that I noticed) presentations that focused on the research side of the enhancement / modification / intervention issue. Obviously, these technologies need to be tested, and Dr. Gifford described an interesting means of distinguishing "enhancement" from "therapy" in that the research protocol for enhancement may necessarily be different from the research protocol for therapy. That is, someone seeking a procedure out of curiosity or a desire to gain an ability or feature that he or she previously lacked would be a very different research subject (from ethical and motivational standpoints) than someone seeking a procedure as a means to regain health or even save his or her life.
I also learned some basic (and seemingly obvious, now that I've learned them) principles of the meaning and implications of research. Before any new medical technology is released to the public, trials must be run in order to ascertain safety and efficacy according to certain applied standards. Some sick people may indeed end up being helped during a research trial, but there is plenty of likelihood that a person might receive a placebo or an experimental treatment that ends up being ineffective. Dr. Gifford pointed out that some people who end up in research trials might make the mistake of confusing this with "treatment", and certainly, this is something to keep in mind. Research is certainly needed, but in conducting research, medical scientists and the like must take care not to, for instance, target vulnerable populations when seeking volunteers for potentially risky studies. An example of a "vulnerable population" might be a group of people who, while they participate in the trial and are paid a small sum, would never be able to actually benefit from the potentially-costly results of the research.
Dr. Gifford suggested some possible guidelines for determining the ethical justifiability of clinical research. Social value and scientific validity were suggested (though I maintain that "social value" is extremely subjective and suggests some sort of collectivist philosophy -- how many people need to think something is a good idea before it is deemed to have "social value"?). It seemed as if there might have been a hint of the "resource allocation" model of investment distribution in this presentation -- Dr. Gifford also suggested that perhaps a potential enhancement ought to be scrutinized in terms of whether it sought to extend a person's capabilities "beyond human nature", whether it would be likely to "change the self", and whether it was "merely cosmetic / aesthetic".
Whenever someone brings up notions of "human nature" or "the self" these days, I can't help but feel compelled to wonder what that person's definition is of these things -- neither is a very useful term on its own. Overall, I would say that the primary value of the "Ethical Issues in Enhancement Research" segment of the presentation was the emphasis on research protocols and research ethics. This is something that transhumanists and scientists (and transhumanist scientists especially!) should spend plenty of time considering when thinking about, or proposing, various potential modifications -- how are we going to find out if they are safe and effective?
Robert Schwartz, J.D., brought up what is definitely becoming a pervasive cultural issue: that of body modification, and the health care profession's involvement in such practices. This was a tremendously interesting presentation -- body modification is one of those things that I am slowly coming to understand, mainly in the context of it potentially being a way for someone to engage in self-directed evolution and aesthetic control.
When I think about it objectively, I can't see very much of a difference in motivation between getting a particular haircut and getting a particular piercing. In both cases, the impetus has something to do with a person wanting to make his or her outer form match some artistic, aesthetic, and / or functional ideal. However, though the impetus may be the same regardless of what modification is introduced, the degree of extremity of modification can vary considerably.
Schwartz sorted body modification into three categories:
Class I: No public health consequences, few-to-no private health consequences. This class includes such things as clothing and hairstyles. Nobody but the individual and his or her preferred retailer / stylist need be involved in these sorts of aesthetic variables.
Class II: Few health concerns (public or private) but potential for some. This class includes tattoos, piercing, branding, and scarification. Some potential for injury or infection exists, however, these procedures are performed by (usually) licensed professional body-modifiers and not by doctors. Doctors may become involved if there are complications, but these procedures are usually not considered medical in nature in the absence of complications.
Class III: Major modifications that must be performed by doctors -- breast enlargement / reduction, sex reassignment surgery, circumcision (though this is sometimes performed by religious officials), and even "foot shaping". This category of modification is perhaps of greatest concern, at least in terms of potential risk: anyone seeking to undergo such modification is putting themselves at risk of potentially severe injury, loss of prior functionality, or even death.
These sorts of modifications raise the issue of the worthiness of psychological and identity factors in justifying what amounts to major surgery -- though I am sure that most people who undergo such procedures do not do so lightly (particularly in the case of sex reassignment).
Mr. Schwartz then went on to list some of the specific motivations different people might have for undergoing body modification of various kinds. The most "acceptable" reason, from a cultural standpoint, would be a therapeutic one -- I would interpret this as being things like repairing a cleft palate that is interfering with one's ability to eat and breathe, or breast reduction surgery to ease the strain on one's back. Next might come that of financial gain -- certain modifications, such as those chosen by Cat Man and Lizard Man, offer one the chance at a rather lucrative career in entertaining and performance art. Some (perhaps most commonly, especially in the case of Class I and II modifications) use aesthetics as a means to communicate such things as internally-perceived identity, membership in a club, gang, or other social grouping, or simple rebellion. And still others poke, prod, pull, scar, and implant as a means of expressing or experiencing states that they deem spiritual or religious.
Whatever the reason, any modification that has the potential to (or necessity of) involving medical professionals may need to be regulated for the sake of protecting would-be modifiers and providing them with needed health services. However, there is a lingering unanswered (and probably hotly disputed) question as to how much modification one's insurance ought to cover.
While few would argue that some potential modifications (such as the example given of "foot shaping" -- with the motivation of wanting one's feet to look better in designer shoes) linger at or near the "superfluous" or "luxury" category, regulation of body modification needs to be well thought out and justified according to real (economic, medical) criteria rather than simple prejudice.
For another entry in the "horrible things I didn't know about before" category, Mr. Schwartz noted that until 30 - 40 years ago (presumably in the United States), some regions actually harbored and enforced what were known as "Ugly Laws". These laws stated that, for the sake of maintaining a certain degree of public "beauty", people who were "maimed or otherwise unsightly" were restricted from appearing in some public places at certain times (or possibly all the time).
This was a very telling thing to learn in terms of what I've recently come to understand about disability rights: the notion that people who look a certain way, for whatever reason, aren't fit to be seen as part of the visible human community. In a sense, modifiers and enhancers could be the natural allies of those "born different": in the sense that the more aesthetic variations permitted to form the visible spectrum of human diversity, the more exposure people will end up having to the unexpected -- eventually, the more typical folks will have to acknowledge the existence of people that hover outside statistical norms.
Laura Colleton, J.D.'s presentation addressed the "enhancement or therapy?" issue from the standpoint of legal and insurance definitions and regulations. Ms. Colleton astutely pointed out something that science-fixated transhumanst and tech progressive types (myself included) ought to remain cogent of: while scientists may not draw a clear line between therapies and enhancement, insurance companies most certainly do.
Ms. Colleton used two examples of conditions that fall along a symptomological spectrum: one "physical" (chronic pain) and one "mental" (depression). Both conditions are often very difficult to assess, in terms of severity and need for treatment, by anyone who does not happen to be the particular individual complaining of either or both of these. The concept of a "range around the average" was suggested as a guideline for determining need for services and possible coverage of services.
Despite realizing that insurance companies do need a means to determine how to offer coverage, how much coverage to offer, and to whom it ought to be offered, I tend toward thinking that a "benefit of the doubt" philosophy should be employed in favor of the patient.
Next came the tag-team presentation by Nikki Sullivan, Ph.D., and Susan Stryker, Ph.D. -- this was definitely a very academic piece, one which activated some very old English and History class neurons in my brain. For several hours after this presentation I admittedly had difficulty figuring out what point these ladies were trying to make, but then it occurred to me that they hadn't been arguing against or in favor of any particular thing; this was one of the more "consciousness raising" talks, one designed to prompt the listener to think carefully and question certain cultural constraints that might seem transparent to the uninformed.
I admit that I expected something quite a bit more, well, graphic upon learning of a talk with the phrase "self-demand amputation" in the title. But this was so definitely not a plea to allow people to cut off various limbs with reckless abandon -- it was more of a call for people to consider why such an idea might be disturbing in the first place.
It's certainly an intriguing thought exercise. Drs. Sullivan and Stryker put forth some intriguing historical examples in which bodily "wholeness" was certainly shown to be quite an arbitrary idea, and one potentially influenced by the state-perceived economic and social usefulness of a person possessing certain "equipment". For instance, at certain points in the past, it was a capital offence for a man of soldier age to cut off the fingers of his sword hand (people could actually be beheaded for cutting off their own fingers, which strikes me as terribly bizarre!). However, the same man could cut off his own genitals without penalty. This example clearly indicates that penalties for certain amputations were less rooted in some sort of inherent and visceral notion of bodily integrity, but in a perception of which parts a man needed in order to be a useful tool of the state (no pun intended).
Drs. Sullivan and Stryker discussed transsexual surgery, and how this is becoming more and more culturally acceptable as time goes on and notions of gender and wholeness adapt to fit an ever-evolving society. Perhaps transsexuals were initially persecuted not because of what they were doing, physically, to their bodies, but because of a sense that changing from male to female, or female to male, upsets some aspect of gender binaries and the social order. I definitely appreciated being made to think about what the potential sources of people's "gut reactions" might be.
Thus ends Part 3 of my report on the IEET conference. Stay tuned for Part 4 (and possibly a Part 5, depending on how long Part 4 ends up being) coming later this week.
Tuesday, May 30, 2006
Monday, May 29, 2006
IEET Conference - Comprehensive Report - Part 2
Introduction * Part 1 * Part 2 * Part 3 * Part 4 * Part 5
This entry represents Part 2 of a comprehensive report on the talks I attended at the Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights conference presented by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. The narrative presented here represents my own personal observations and interpretations of the event and the subject matter discussed therein, and I encourage anyone who reads this who was also in attendance to note any factual errors I may have made and to offer any criticisms of my responses that seem merited.
11:00 AM - 12:00 PM - Parental Obligations and the Consent of the Unborn
This was a panel moderated by Dr. James Hughes. Panel members were Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, J.D. whose talk was entitled "Parental Liability for Germline Genetic Enhancement: To Be or Not to Be?" and Martin Gunderson, Ph.D., who discussed "Genetic Engineering and the Consent of Future Generations".
Ms. Smolensky's presentation was introduced with a series of conditions that were put forth as a matter of focusing the talk on particular legal issues that might ensue from parental manipulation of the genes of a fetus. These conditions were:
1.) That, for the purposes of discussion, genetic alterations be limited to those applied to the pre-born.
2.) That, for the purposes of discussion, germline changes, rather than somatic changes, are assumed to be the issue.
3.) That, for the purposes of discussion, whatever technology required to accomplish these germline changes is safe and effective (it will not produce effects other than the intended enhancement or decrease viability, and will definitely work if applied).
4.) That, for the purposes of discussion, enhancement rather than "gene therapy" is the subject at hand.
Smolensky did not go into depth in defining "enhancement" from her perspective and distinguishing it from "therapy", however, I can understand why, since it was not extremely relevant to the main topic of her presentation, which was that of potential reactions to (and legal actions taken by) children who grow up and decide that they want to sue their parents for violating their "right to an unaltered genome". There are international documents that supposedly (I haven't read these documents, but I can assume Smolensky has) attempt to define such a right.
This presentation described some of the history of parental rights and liabilities, which was quite relevant since familial ties do often result in different responses to possible instances of abuse or neglect. The concept of "parental tort immunity" was explained, and this was quite interesting since I'd never heard of this concept before. Basically, this "tort immunity" was established originally to protect the members of a family not involved in a particular dispute from being adversely affected by the consequences of that dispute. An example of this, Smolensky pointed out, would be a case in which one child sued his or her parents -- this could, in certain cases (depending on locale and time period) be denied on the basis that if one child in the family took all the financial assets, siblings might suffer.
I learned (to my horror) that children were often considered as "property" into the 1800s. Clearly, much has happened since then in terms of improving the treatment of children and the overall sense of respect for children as autonomous human beings. This very question of whether it is ethical for a parent to alter their children (and their children's children, by virtue of germline manipulation) is a result of this improved (though still imperfect) uplifting of children's rights. The recognition of children (and possibly fetuses, at various stages of development) as "people" has led, in some cases, to things like children suing a parent for what they perceive to be "wrongful birth" (based on the fact that a child was born with severe disabilities -- I think it is absolutely terrible that anyone would be so unhappy with their own existence as to seek damages for the mere fact of being born!), and deliberations over whether someone who injures a pregnant woman must be also penalized for any injury to the child she carries.
Smolensky noted that mothers are sometimes held liable for behavior during pregnancy that affects the developing fetus. She suggested that perhaps genetic enhancement of a fetus would fall outside the realm of "lifestyle choices" on the part of the mother, since changes made to the genetics of a fetus in no way impact a woman's ability to live any particular lifestyle while pregnant.
Given that there are already people who attempt to sue their parents as a result of pre-birth injury, but also in response to having been born in the first place, it does not seem likely that a coherent definition of a legal right to an unaltered genome is possible. I would suggest that genetic enhancement is only one of many variables that could affect a developing child, and that this variable is not fundamentally different from any other environmental or intentional action taken prior to a child's birth -- therefore, it is not a question of whether the developing child has a "right" to an unaltered (or altered) genome but a question of what is or is not good for the child. Obviously, many societies have taken steps to protect children and describe the legal implications of being part of a family (particularly when there is dispute between family members requiring mediation from an outside agent).
I would agree with Smolensky that the question of whether or not to enhance at a particular stage of development is a moral question rather than a legal one. There are plenty of moral caveats that ought to be applied to "enhancement" -- in my estimation, despite the subjectivity of the idea of an enhancement, there are indeed some germline interventions that I would be more ethically okay with than others. For instance, I cannot see any justification for making a child taller than s/he might have been otherwise, but I can certainly see something like "increased resistance to cancer" as being quite justifiable, assuming that Smolensky's condition of "safe and effective" holds.
However, Smolensky's assertions and conclusions based on her piece seemed to me to be overly dependent on the conditions set forth at the beginning. It is, after all, highly unlikely that a "safe and effective" guarantee could ever be applied to something like genetic manipulation -- and this, in and of itself, would complicate the legal situation beyond the question of whether a supposedly innocuous or beneficial modification could be contested by a person who grows up with such a modification. If, for instance, a supposed "enhancement" were applied that would make a person resistant to skin cancer, but had the "side effect" of causing infertility or chronic pain conditions, then the legal question might become more complex, and there is really no way around the moral question of whether someone should take the chance of applying a modification that may grant better health but may also result in detrimental effects.
Dr. Martin Gunderson's presentation focused on the notion of consent, particularly the incoherence of the concept of consent as applied to a fetus or to "future generations". He introduced himself as ideologically Kantian -- specifically, a "nervous Kantian". I would take "nervous Kantian" to indicate a support for Kantian notions of autonomy (and that a truly autonomous being will act morally), but a concurrent caveat that all endeavors which pose moral questions ought to be undertaken with caution.
Consent, as Dr. Gunderson described it, is a contractual component of interactions that can alter the normative relation between individuals. Examples provided of this include the fact that consent is what distinguishes invited entry from trespassing, and gift-giving or borrowing from stealing. Objecively, the same physical outcome ensues in each case -- whether stolen or borrowed, an object passes hands between people, and whether invited or not, a person who enters a house still ends up inside. Consent necessarily involves two parties, both of which are capable of some sort of communication and negotiation. If one party has no awareness of the other, consent is impossible -- though it is not necessarily the capacity for consent that determines the moral flavor of an action. (An infant cannot consent to life-saving heart surgery, for example, but most would agree that performing such surgery would be more ethical than not performing it)
I agree that it is indeed incoherent to make decisions pertaining to enhancement based on whether future generations can, or would, consent or refuse a particular thing. What is more important to consider is principle -- Gunderson suggested an "enhanced notion of Kantian autonomy" as a guideline for making decisions. We should not put up absolute barriers to enhancement, since there may indeed be cases where such a thing is justified, but caution should always be in order.
During the Q&A session, someone astutely pointed out that perhaps doctors would be a more likely and logical target of lawsuits, and that "informed consent" on the part of a parent seeking genetic modification to his or her child might not be possible. Given the fact that very few patients nowadays tend to know exactly what their doctors are doing to them, and why, this is indeed an important consideration for future medical technologies and is likely to be an important consideration well into the indefinite future while so few patients are sufficiently "well informed" (unless they devote a significant portion of their time studying the medical treatments they need, or are likely to need -- which I know, from personal and secondhand experience, can result in a case where the patient actually knows more than the doctor about a particular thing.)
1:00 PM - 2:45 PM - Celebrating Morphological Diversity
This was a panel moderated by Dale Carrico, Ph.D.. Panel members were Robin Zebrowski whose talk was entitled "Every Body is Already Different: How The Myth of a Standard Body Feeds The Myth of an Authentic Self", Anita Silvers, Ph.D., who asserted "The Right Not To Be Normal as the Essence of Freedom", Shannon Ramdin, who discussed "Transhumanism and the O(/o)ther", and Jess Cadwallader who discussed "Suffering, Bodily Tolerances, and 'Enhancement' Discourse".
This panel discussion was definitely a highlight of the conference -- I have noted some possible areas of tension between transhumanism and disability rights, however, I am firmly convinced that people who lie outside statistical norms in whatever respect, be it mental or physical, have something in common regardless of whether they were born a certain way or decided to evolve in a certain manner over the course of their lives. That is, persons with different ability sets (whatever the reason) and different morphological features ought to be able to coexist in a just, ethical, and inclusive society. As a side note, I am somewhat disturbed when I come across writings by those who dismiss transhumanists as "loonies" simply on the basis that we / they would consider modifying our bodies to work differently, or look "more different" than several standard deviations away from the typical. "Because it would look like something I'm not used to" is not a valid argument, and harkens back to times when people considered "too ugly" or "disfigured" to appear in public were locked away or relegated to carnival sideshows.
Throughout Robin Zebrowski's talk, I found myself agreeing wholeheartedly -- though the ideas presented in her paper were most definitely important and perhaps not commonly spoken about around your average American dinner table, she did not use any terminology that necessitated consultation of Wikipedia prior to writing this commentary. Not that I mind looking up things in Wikipedia, or any other reference -- I am always happy to learn -- but there is a legitimate concern raised by some that at times, progressivism and transhumanism tend toward jargon-heavy "Academese" and if we cannot put the necessary ideas into more common language, bringing these ideas to the General Public will take far longer than perhaps it should. (Personally, I think we really ought to be teaching schoolchildren better critical thinking skills and offering them the chance to study logic and philosophy starting at the elementary level -- but education reform is another topic entirely). I think it was Wesley Smith who raised the issue of "Academese" during the Q&A session of this panel, however, he'd missed Zebrowski's talk.
Ms. Zebrowski got everyone's attention at the beginning by quoting Francis Fukuyama and his notion of "human essence". I agree with Zebrowski, and others, that there quite seriously can be no coherent definition of "human essence" that at the same time is inconsistent with the inherent diversity of humanity. Zebrowski sought to, like several speakers, offer a more rational definition of human nature or essence based on the wonderful truism that there is, absolutely, no such thing as normal. Despite alarmist fears, there is no reason that the introduction and proliferation of modification technologies would lead to a society in which everyone sought to become the ideal of "white male strength and mobility". That is, enhancement should not be thought of as an inevitable means to the creation of a "superior superclass".
Critics of enhancement, Zebrowski noted, contradict themselves when suggesting that human nature is independent of body shape (that is, people are people regardless of hair color, eye color, number of limbs, other morphological features, etc.) but then at the same time asserting that changing the body (or the genome) violates "human nature". In the "things I didn't know prior to hearing this talk" category was the fact that each individual has around 100 mutations that his or her parents did not have. At which point can critics say that a human is human based on any physical or genetic characteristic, or set of characteristics? If there is no standard body, and no standard genome, and no standard set of abilities, who is to say that adding additional diversity to the mix through the exercise of conscious volition threatens the integrity of anything at all?
Zebrowski's talk was ideologically compatible with something I've heard Dr. James Hughes mention in several contexts -- the idea of "human racism" and the notion that revulsion at certain gene configurations and morphological features is really no different from the past qualms many people had about "racial mixing" and "racial purity" based on such things as skin color. I would wager that those who argue that we ought to keep the "human race" pure in some sense have not thought very carefully about what they are saying. I can see the point that if we're not careful and proceed in an overly ambitious manner with trying out all sorts of modifications, we could end up making ourselves extinct -- but this doesn't have to happen, of course, particularly if the transhumanist goal of achieving greater moral wisdom as we enter the future comes to pass. One thing I think the "human racists" are missing is the fact that nobody is advocating compulsory enhancements for anyone -- the idea is that people should have the autonomy to choose their own form and function based on the goals they have for themselves. And suggesting that people with "enhancements" of any sort would be polluting or threatening the human race by passing any changes down to their children is as ethically questionable as suggesting that persons with disabillities have no right to reproduce if they so desire.
In closing, Zebrowski noted that the fact that no standard body or self exists does not mean we have "nothing". Rather, human nature and the identity of a person is rooted in the acts, choices, activities, and goals of that individual. This definition of identity appeals to me on many levels: not only is it independent of morphology, it is ethically consistent -- inclusive of individuals who choose certain modifications and individuals who do not.
The next talk, delivered by Dr. Anita Silvers, was a delight to listen to. I was particularly interested in hearing this talk when I read the program, and its title -- "The Right Not To Be Normal as the Essence of Freedom" -- is actually one of the things that compelled me to attend the IEET conference in the first place.
Dr. Silvers began by noting that biological properties are not inherently strengths or weaknesses. This is an extremely important concept to take note of in both the transhumanist and disability rights arenas. By recognizing the simple fact of the neutrality of biological properties and differences (and the potential for different attributes to optimize the individual for particular environments or tasks), one allows for the coexistence of a dramatically diverse range of persons.
Dr. Silvers noted a particular example -- that of artificial feet -- to highlight the cognitive dissonance inherent in both disability discrimination and enhancement-based discrimination. In the past, athletes were sometimes barred from competing in olympic events on the basis that amputees with artificial feet would be at an inherent disadvantage due to the "clunkiness" of these feet. However, now the situation is approaching a reversal in that some athletes are finding that their adaptive technology -- more advanced artificial feet used during running or bicycling -- has the potential to disqualify them from some events on the basis that their assistive technology confers too much of an advantage. This situation is a clear example of how the so-called "natural" is glorified for no particular coherent reason, and people who have chosen or received technologies that enable them to reach their personal goals could be excluded from attempting such goals on the basis that they've put themselves outside a sort of random lottery. Many people still seem to put a ridiculous mental barrier between notions of non-technological "enhancement" (such as a nutritious diet and an exercise or training program that increases one's running prowess) and technologically-based interventions.
Disqualifying a runner from running on the basis that s/he makes use of assistive technology makes as little sense to me as taking away the keyboard communication device of an autistic / mute person and not allowing them to communicate unless they can use speech. In short, discriminating against people who achieve their goals through self-directed or nonstandard means sets a dangerous precedent: that of forcing people into a narrow range of paths to particular goals.
Dr. Silvers also made what I consider to be a very important point regarding individuals described as disabled, connecting this point with the notion of the neutrality of biological characteristics. In an example I particularly liked, she related a story of a man who sought work as a physical therapist but who ended up having some social difficulties in one phase of his endeavor. These difficulties were addressed and discussed, and it turned out that the man "probably had Asperger's". He was sent to work with severely "multiply handicapped" children, and ended up getting positively glowing performance reviews. Apparently, many people not on the autistic spectrum can be extremely uncomfortable working with such children -- only this man, on the spectrum himself, saw no qualitative difference between these children and anyone else. (This is not to say that all nonautistic people are discriminatory or that all autistic people are naturally open-minded, but in this case the therapist's supposed "disability" made it possible for him to perform a job, very well, that few people were capable of doing even an average job at).
This story reminded me of how I immediately approached a girl in my preschool class, trying to be her friend. I knew she was Deaf (the teacher explained to us a bit about how her hearing aid worked) but apparently she had some sort of facial "deformity". I had absolutely no idea that there was anything remotely different about her face, until one of my parents noted what I think was a newspaper article describing how this little girl was undergoing surgery to "fix her face". I'd never perceived anything "wrong" with her face. Despite my own social issues and atypical perceptual style, I do feel strongly that I am optimized for certain tasks and abilities. It's good to know that some people, like Dr. Silvers, agree with this assessment.
Dr. Silvers spoke negatively of programs that seek to "raise statistical averages" to the detriment of individuals. This makes me think of how my high school had a program to send "troubled" students to a different school under the auspice of giving them a "more appropriate environment", but then this same school would claim a "99% graduation rate". There was nothing inherent about the school that encouraged students to stick with it and graduate rather than dropping out; it was just that they identified potential "dropouts" and quickly shuffled them off somewhere else before they could drop out and hurt the average. This sort of policy makes it all the more difficult for atypical, disabled, differently-enabled (or whatever word one finds most appropriate) individuals to find their niche in a particular environment, whether it be academic, career, or social. Diversity (which I would interpret as diversity that is acknowledged and "out in the open"), according to Silvers, discourages eugenics by encouraging accomodation of and recognition of the value of different traits as applied to particular roles.
Eugenics programs fail the pragmatic test by forcing biological properties to be sorted into "strengths and weaknesses", when this is a line that cannot be easily or realistically drawn -- except possibly in the case of sheer viability. (That is, I do not have any moral problems with modifying a fetus which would certainly die without such a modification on the basis that being alive is better than being dead!).
Dr. Silvers concluded by noting that many debates surrounding enhancement and disability assume that humans as a group are naturally competitive, or that competition is always (or should be) the Thing To Worry About when choosing one's life goals or bearing offspring. While there is certainly some competition inherent in human interactions, there are also numerous examples of cooperation. Living should not be about trying to be "better" than others or worrying that one must give one's children a "competitive advantage", but rather, thinking in terms of the potential for each person to fill a unique role and pursue unique goals.
Shannon Ramdin spoke next -- her presentation made extensive use of words like "hedgemony", which I admit made it somewhat difficult to follow. This talk was cautionary in the vein of Dr. Nigel Cameron's, at least in the sense of warning against technology being used as a means to power and having this power concentrated in a group known for its tendencies toward corruption. Ms. Ramdin noted that despite initial impressions of the Internet as being a sort of great equalizer, at present the Internet is only reflecting the lives of people who can afford computers and Internet access. She cautioned against assuming inherent goodness in technologies that "came out of" white male hedgemony and dominant paradigms.
A critique of Donna Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto was offered on the grounds that this writing exhibited excessive levels of "techno-optimism". Not having read the Cyborg Manifesto myself (something I will certainly need to remedy in the near future), I cannot comment specifically on the optimism or philosophies described in this essay, but I think I have a decent enough understanding of what "techno-optimism" might have meant in the context of Ms. Ramdin's presentation.
One point that I agreed wholeheartedly with Ramdin on is the fact that in order to succeed as a "broad ideological movement", transhumansim must necessarily embrace the "political paradigms of non-dominant groups". As much as I agree that periodic reminders of the existence of non-dominant groups are essential to any ideological movement that seeks to be inclusive of all conscious beings, I would argue that transhumanism is already quite cogent of the existence of, and right to exist of, non-dominant groups. After all, transhumanism is a non-dominant group. And as a person who is (a) female, and (b) legally and medically considered "disabled" to a certain extent (and I acknowledge that in some environments, such as noisy pubs or behind the wheel of a car, I am obviously and undeniably disabled), I have experienced nothing but benefit from the technologies I have chosen to make use of.
Computers, and the Internet especially, have enabled me to an extent that would not otherwise be possible. Regardless of whether any wealthy white males might be responsible for the invention of some technologies I benefit from, in no way does my participation in discussion online support the notion of a dominantly white-wealthy-male transhumanist paradigm. While it is important to keep historical records as to how certain technologies came to be, it makes little sense to me to dwell on the social origins of certain pices of technology. Though some degree of inequality persists when it comes to access to technology, one cannot deny the fact that basic computing functionality is becoming more and more accessible. And it doesn't really matter who invented what or where it came from -- the innovative tendencies and imagination of humans makes it possible for many people to look at something that exists and use it for something that its creators possibly never intended. Once an object or technology comes into being it is neutral, a tool, that people can and should be able to use without being locked into a particular notion of how that tool should be used based on its origins.
The accelerating rate of advancement in computing technology means that there is a lot of perfectly functional, but unused, hardware lying around (I've got a fair amount of it in my apartment). It's difficult to give this equipment away. One social program I've thought might be a tremendously positive investment would be a program to collect and distribute this recently-obsolete equipment to those who cannot afford computers. Some might suggest that the imbalance of power might still remain between those with the fastest, top-of-the-line computers and those with slightly older models, but surely, this imbalance would be much smaller. (Of course, there are still people in the world lacking electricity hookups and phone line access and basic sanitation, but my suggesting a computer-distribution project does not in any way imply that other, severe, social and political imbalances cannot and will not be addressed in parallel. One mistake I often encounter in assessments of up-and-coming technologies is the notion that things need to happen in a particular order, or not at all. This argument basically amounts to a potential mandate for people's career choices to be made for them on the basis of some organization's or government's idea of what the world needs most. This is both undesirable and unnecessary.)
I do not mean to come across as unduly critical of Ramdin's presentation -- I think it is extremely important for people to continue providing critiques and caveats of transhumanism, whatever their interpretation of transhumanism may be. Without these caveats and critiques, the potential for intellectual laziness and an inability to respond cogently to future critiques could be a danger. I do not believe that any philosophy or notion is beyond and above criticism, and reminding would-be enhancers, transhumanists, and the like that we must remain aware of the potential to hinder equality rather than foster it and take necessary steps to prevent this.
The final speaker on this panel was Jess Cadwallader, who focused on the subjectivity of suffering and the difficulty of using the concept of suffering as a basis for drawing ethical conclusions. Ms. Cadwallader pointed out that while suffering is often considered to be culture-independent (i.e., "natural"), the very category of "natural" is itself a construct defined and described within the framework of a culture. One astute observation here was that culture tends to define what can be observed and what can be expressed. I would suggest that this aspect of culture is part of what makes it difficult for some people to accurately and convincingly express themselves -- their experiences simply lie beyond current cultural constraints of language and associated vocabulary and even appearance.
When something happens that is not immediately recognizable, cultures tend to sort this unfamiliar happening into a pre-existing category that may in fact be only superficially appropriate (and therefore wholly inappropriate). Hence, some types of suffering may be completely missed or ignored, while other things might be interpreted as suffering when, in fact, they are not. I imagine that this phenomenon is responsible for some of the discrimination experienced by autistic people (who are often assumed to be lacking or suffering due to atypical body language or preferred activities) and the difficulty some injured or ill people have in obtaining appropriate pain management ("You don't look like you're in pain!").
Ms. Cadwallader introduced the idea of "Power Knowledge", and discussed three components of this:
1.) The body as "project": something to be worked on such that it expresses what the individual feels to be his or her true self. (An example that comes to mind here is that of a transgendered individual who undergoes surgery and hormone treatments such that the outer form is coherent with the inner form).
2.) The "Teleological Life Narrative", or tendency of people to see their lives as goal-directed.
3.) Notions of pathology, difference, and deviance.
Ms. Cadwallader suggested, as an example, "shortness" as a property that might conceivably result in the suffering of a child. However, depending on the cultural climate in which a child grows up, shortness might be considered advantageous or disadvantageous, beautiful or ugly. For a parent to make the choice of, say, height enhancement on the basis that shortness will result in suffering opens up quite a realm of potential debate. By refusing to bring a person into the world who will fall within a certain percentile of height, the percentile itself will be shifted over time. The ethical question here is primarily one of whether it is more dangerous to bring a person into the world knowing that person may suffer for their deviance from a cultural norm, or whether not bringing a statistically-atypical person into being promotes a society that holds ever-narrowing views as to what sort of person is allowed to exist.
I personally think there is no question that "normative" or primarily mainstream-competitive "enhancements" (such as height alteration or certain sorts of neurological alteration) would be a terrible thing -- though some individuals may suffer for being different, it seems that any parent who seeks to produce an average child who will somehow be granted immunity to prejudice on the basis of having an appearance and ability set that does not offend the sensibilities of the dominant cultural group is taking the "lazy" way out. With a truly supportive family, there is no reason that anyone has to suffer, regardless of how different from supposed norms they may be. I often encounter a similar argument in discussions of autism -- some parents would remove their child's most harmless quirks if they had the choice, on the basis that these quirks prompt bullying -- this seems extremely misdirected to me, since it seems that it should be the bullies who are chastised and urged to change rather than their victims.
Ms. Cadwallader noted in closing (or at least, where my notes on this presentation end -- this segment of my article may be expanded upon if I can find the audio for this presentation) that it is important to acknowledge that freedom, choice, health, and notions of 'enhancement' occur within a culture. And this presentation brought to light the important caveat -- one I agree with more so than other caveats presented during this conference -- that we must take note of how contemporary procedures are being used toward the ends of "normalisation" and be wary of supporting philosophical definitions of suffering that encourage homogenization.
This entry represents Part 2 of a comprehensive report on the talks I attended at the Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights conference presented by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. The narrative presented here represents my own personal observations and interpretations of the event and the subject matter discussed therein, and I encourage anyone who reads this who was also in attendance to note any factual errors I may have made and to offer any criticisms of my responses that seem merited.
11:00 AM - 12:00 PM - Parental Obligations and the Consent of the Unborn
This was a panel moderated by Dr. James Hughes. Panel members were Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, J.D. whose talk was entitled "Parental Liability for Germline Genetic Enhancement: To Be or Not to Be?" and Martin Gunderson, Ph.D., who discussed "Genetic Engineering and the Consent of Future Generations".
Ms. Smolensky's presentation was introduced with a series of conditions that were put forth as a matter of focusing the talk on particular legal issues that might ensue from parental manipulation of the genes of a fetus. These conditions were:
1.) That, for the purposes of discussion, genetic alterations be limited to those applied to the pre-born.
2.) That, for the purposes of discussion, germline changes, rather than somatic changes, are assumed to be the issue.
3.) That, for the purposes of discussion, whatever technology required to accomplish these germline changes is safe and effective (it will not produce effects other than the intended enhancement or decrease viability, and will definitely work if applied).
4.) That, for the purposes of discussion, enhancement rather than "gene therapy" is the subject at hand.
Smolensky did not go into depth in defining "enhancement" from her perspective and distinguishing it from "therapy", however, I can understand why, since it was not extremely relevant to the main topic of her presentation, which was that of potential reactions to (and legal actions taken by) children who grow up and decide that they want to sue their parents for violating their "right to an unaltered genome". There are international documents that supposedly (I haven't read these documents, but I can assume Smolensky has) attempt to define such a right.
This presentation described some of the history of parental rights and liabilities, which was quite relevant since familial ties do often result in different responses to possible instances of abuse or neglect. The concept of "parental tort immunity" was explained, and this was quite interesting since I'd never heard of this concept before. Basically, this "tort immunity" was established originally to protect the members of a family not involved in a particular dispute from being adversely affected by the consequences of that dispute. An example of this, Smolensky pointed out, would be a case in which one child sued his or her parents -- this could, in certain cases (depending on locale and time period) be denied on the basis that if one child in the family took all the financial assets, siblings might suffer.
I learned (to my horror) that children were often considered as "property" into the 1800s. Clearly, much has happened since then in terms of improving the treatment of children and the overall sense of respect for children as autonomous human beings. This very question of whether it is ethical for a parent to alter their children (and their children's children, by virtue of germline manipulation) is a result of this improved (though still imperfect) uplifting of children's rights. The recognition of children (and possibly fetuses, at various stages of development) as "people" has led, in some cases, to things like children suing a parent for what they perceive to be "wrongful birth" (based on the fact that a child was born with severe disabilities -- I think it is absolutely terrible that anyone would be so unhappy with their own existence as to seek damages for the mere fact of being born!), and deliberations over whether someone who injures a pregnant woman must be also penalized for any injury to the child she carries.
Smolensky noted that mothers are sometimes held liable for behavior during pregnancy that affects the developing fetus. She suggested that perhaps genetic enhancement of a fetus would fall outside the realm of "lifestyle choices" on the part of the mother, since changes made to the genetics of a fetus in no way impact a woman's ability to live any particular lifestyle while pregnant.
Given that there are already people who attempt to sue their parents as a result of pre-birth injury, but also in response to having been born in the first place, it does not seem likely that a coherent definition of a legal right to an unaltered genome is possible. I would suggest that genetic enhancement is only one of many variables that could affect a developing child, and that this variable is not fundamentally different from any other environmental or intentional action taken prior to a child's birth -- therefore, it is not a question of whether the developing child has a "right" to an unaltered (or altered) genome but a question of what is or is not good for the child. Obviously, many societies have taken steps to protect children and describe the legal implications of being part of a family (particularly when there is dispute between family members requiring mediation from an outside agent).
I would agree with Smolensky that the question of whether or not to enhance at a particular stage of development is a moral question rather than a legal one. There are plenty of moral caveats that ought to be applied to "enhancement" -- in my estimation, despite the subjectivity of the idea of an enhancement, there are indeed some germline interventions that I would be more ethically okay with than others. For instance, I cannot see any justification for making a child taller than s/he might have been otherwise, but I can certainly see something like "increased resistance to cancer" as being quite justifiable, assuming that Smolensky's condition of "safe and effective" holds.
However, Smolensky's assertions and conclusions based on her piece seemed to me to be overly dependent on the conditions set forth at the beginning. It is, after all, highly unlikely that a "safe and effective" guarantee could ever be applied to something like genetic manipulation -- and this, in and of itself, would complicate the legal situation beyond the question of whether a supposedly innocuous or beneficial modification could be contested by a person who grows up with such a modification. If, for instance, a supposed "enhancement" were applied that would make a person resistant to skin cancer, but had the "side effect" of causing infertility or chronic pain conditions, then the legal question might become more complex, and there is really no way around the moral question of whether someone should take the chance of applying a modification that may grant better health but may also result in detrimental effects.
Dr. Martin Gunderson's presentation focused on the notion of consent, particularly the incoherence of the concept of consent as applied to a fetus or to "future generations". He introduced himself as ideologically Kantian -- specifically, a "nervous Kantian". I would take "nervous Kantian" to indicate a support for Kantian notions of autonomy (and that a truly autonomous being will act morally), but a concurrent caveat that all endeavors which pose moral questions ought to be undertaken with caution.
Consent, as Dr. Gunderson described it, is a contractual component of interactions that can alter the normative relation between individuals. Examples provided of this include the fact that consent is what distinguishes invited entry from trespassing, and gift-giving or borrowing from stealing. Objecively, the same physical outcome ensues in each case -- whether stolen or borrowed, an object passes hands between people, and whether invited or not, a person who enters a house still ends up inside. Consent necessarily involves two parties, both of which are capable of some sort of communication and negotiation. If one party has no awareness of the other, consent is impossible -- though it is not necessarily the capacity for consent that determines the moral flavor of an action. (An infant cannot consent to life-saving heart surgery, for example, but most would agree that performing such surgery would be more ethical than not performing it)
I agree that it is indeed incoherent to make decisions pertaining to enhancement based on whether future generations can, or would, consent or refuse a particular thing. What is more important to consider is principle -- Gunderson suggested an "enhanced notion of Kantian autonomy" as a guideline for making decisions. We should not put up absolute barriers to enhancement, since there may indeed be cases where such a thing is justified, but caution should always be in order.
During the Q&A session, someone astutely pointed out that perhaps doctors would be a more likely and logical target of lawsuits, and that "informed consent" on the part of a parent seeking genetic modification to his or her child might not be possible. Given the fact that very few patients nowadays tend to know exactly what their doctors are doing to them, and why, this is indeed an important consideration for future medical technologies and is likely to be an important consideration well into the indefinite future while so few patients are sufficiently "well informed" (unless they devote a significant portion of their time studying the medical treatments they need, or are likely to need -- which I know, from personal and secondhand experience, can result in a case where the patient actually knows more than the doctor about a particular thing.)
1:00 PM - 2:45 PM - Celebrating Morphological Diversity
This was a panel moderated by Dale Carrico, Ph.D.. Panel members were Robin Zebrowski whose talk was entitled "Every Body is Already Different: How The Myth of a Standard Body Feeds The Myth of an Authentic Self", Anita Silvers, Ph.D., who asserted "The Right Not To Be Normal as the Essence of Freedom", Shannon Ramdin, who discussed "Transhumanism and the O(/o)ther", and Jess Cadwallader who discussed "Suffering, Bodily Tolerances, and 'Enhancement' Discourse".
This panel discussion was definitely a highlight of the conference -- I have noted some possible areas of tension between transhumanism and disability rights, however, I am firmly convinced that people who lie outside statistical norms in whatever respect, be it mental or physical, have something in common regardless of whether they were born a certain way or decided to evolve in a certain manner over the course of their lives. That is, persons with different ability sets (whatever the reason) and different morphological features ought to be able to coexist in a just, ethical, and inclusive society. As a side note, I am somewhat disturbed when I come across writings by those who dismiss transhumanists as "loonies" simply on the basis that we / they would consider modifying our bodies to work differently, or look "more different" than several standard deviations away from the typical. "Because it would look like something I'm not used to" is not a valid argument, and harkens back to times when people considered "too ugly" or "disfigured" to appear in public were locked away or relegated to carnival sideshows.
Throughout Robin Zebrowski's talk, I found myself agreeing wholeheartedly -- though the ideas presented in her paper were most definitely important and perhaps not commonly spoken about around your average American dinner table, she did not use any terminology that necessitated consultation of Wikipedia prior to writing this commentary. Not that I mind looking up things in Wikipedia, or any other reference -- I am always happy to learn -- but there is a legitimate concern raised by some that at times, progressivism and transhumanism tend toward jargon-heavy "Academese" and if we cannot put the necessary ideas into more common language, bringing these ideas to the General Public will take far longer than perhaps it should. (Personally, I think we really ought to be teaching schoolchildren better critical thinking skills and offering them the chance to study logic and philosophy starting at the elementary level -- but education reform is another topic entirely). I think it was Wesley Smith who raised the issue of "Academese" during the Q&A session of this panel, however, he'd missed Zebrowski's talk.
Ms. Zebrowski got everyone's attention at the beginning by quoting Francis Fukuyama and his notion of "human essence". I agree with Zebrowski, and others, that there quite seriously can be no coherent definition of "human essence" that at the same time is inconsistent with the inherent diversity of humanity. Zebrowski sought to, like several speakers, offer a more rational definition of human nature or essence based on the wonderful truism that there is, absolutely, no such thing as normal. Despite alarmist fears, there is no reason that the introduction and proliferation of modification technologies would lead to a society in which everyone sought to become the ideal of "white male strength and mobility". That is, enhancement should not be thought of as an inevitable means to the creation of a "superior superclass".
Critics of enhancement, Zebrowski noted, contradict themselves when suggesting that human nature is independent of body shape (that is, people are people regardless of hair color, eye color, number of limbs, other morphological features, etc.) but then at the same time asserting that changing the body (or the genome) violates "human nature". In the "things I didn't know prior to hearing this talk" category was the fact that each individual has around 100 mutations that his or her parents did not have. At which point can critics say that a human is human based on any physical or genetic characteristic, or set of characteristics? If there is no standard body, and no standard genome, and no standard set of abilities, who is to say that adding additional diversity to the mix through the exercise of conscious volition threatens the integrity of anything at all?
Zebrowski's talk was ideologically compatible with something I've heard Dr. James Hughes mention in several contexts -- the idea of "human racism" and the notion that revulsion at certain gene configurations and morphological features is really no different from the past qualms many people had about "racial mixing" and "racial purity" based on such things as skin color. I would wager that those who argue that we ought to keep the "human race" pure in some sense have not thought very carefully about what they are saying. I can see the point that if we're not careful and proceed in an overly ambitious manner with trying out all sorts of modifications, we could end up making ourselves extinct -- but this doesn't have to happen, of course, particularly if the transhumanist goal of achieving greater moral wisdom as we enter the future comes to pass. One thing I think the "human racists" are missing is the fact that nobody is advocating compulsory enhancements for anyone -- the idea is that people should have the autonomy to choose their own form and function based on the goals they have for themselves. And suggesting that people with "enhancements" of any sort would be polluting or threatening the human race by passing any changes down to their children is as ethically questionable as suggesting that persons with disabillities have no right to reproduce if they so desire.
In closing, Zebrowski noted that the fact that no standard body or self exists does not mean we have "nothing". Rather, human nature and the identity of a person is rooted in the acts, choices, activities, and goals of that individual. This definition of identity appeals to me on many levels: not only is it independent of morphology, it is ethically consistent -- inclusive of individuals who choose certain modifications and individuals who do not.
The next talk, delivered by Dr. Anita Silvers, was a delight to listen to. I was particularly interested in hearing this talk when I read the program, and its title -- "The Right Not To Be Normal as the Essence of Freedom" -- is actually one of the things that compelled me to attend the IEET conference in the first place.
Dr. Silvers began by noting that biological properties are not inherently strengths or weaknesses. This is an extremely important concept to take note of in both the transhumanist and disability rights arenas. By recognizing the simple fact of the neutrality of biological properties and differences (and the potential for different attributes to optimize the individual for particular environments or tasks), one allows for the coexistence of a dramatically diverse range of persons.
Dr. Silvers noted a particular example -- that of artificial feet -- to highlight the cognitive dissonance inherent in both disability discrimination and enhancement-based discrimination. In the past, athletes were sometimes barred from competing in olympic events on the basis that amputees with artificial feet would be at an inherent disadvantage due to the "clunkiness" of these feet. However, now the situation is approaching a reversal in that some athletes are finding that their adaptive technology -- more advanced artificial feet used during running or bicycling -- has the potential to disqualify them from some events on the basis that their assistive technology confers too much of an advantage. This situation is a clear example of how the so-called "natural" is glorified for no particular coherent reason, and people who have chosen or received technologies that enable them to reach their personal goals could be excluded from attempting such goals on the basis that they've put themselves outside a sort of random lottery. Many people still seem to put a ridiculous mental barrier between notions of non-technological "enhancement" (such as a nutritious diet and an exercise or training program that increases one's running prowess) and technologically-based interventions.
Disqualifying a runner from running on the basis that s/he makes use of assistive technology makes as little sense to me as taking away the keyboard communication device of an autistic / mute person and not allowing them to communicate unless they can use speech. In short, discriminating against people who achieve their goals through self-directed or nonstandard means sets a dangerous precedent: that of forcing people into a narrow range of paths to particular goals.
Dr. Silvers also made what I consider to be a very important point regarding individuals described as disabled, connecting this point with the notion of the neutrality of biological characteristics. In an example I particularly liked, she related a story of a man who sought work as a physical therapist but who ended up having some social difficulties in one phase of his endeavor. These difficulties were addressed and discussed, and it turned out that the man "probably had Asperger's". He was sent to work with severely "multiply handicapped" children, and ended up getting positively glowing performance reviews. Apparently, many people not on the autistic spectrum can be extremely uncomfortable working with such children -- only this man, on the spectrum himself, saw no qualitative difference between these children and anyone else. (This is not to say that all nonautistic people are discriminatory or that all autistic people are naturally open-minded, but in this case the therapist's supposed "disability" made it possible for him to perform a job, very well, that few people were capable of doing even an average job at).
This story reminded me of how I immediately approached a girl in my preschool class, trying to be her friend. I knew she was Deaf (the teacher explained to us a bit about how her hearing aid worked) but apparently she had some sort of facial "deformity". I had absolutely no idea that there was anything remotely different about her face, until one of my parents noted what I think was a newspaper article describing how this little girl was undergoing surgery to "fix her face". I'd never perceived anything "wrong" with her face. Despite my own social issues and atypical perceptual style, I do feel strongly that I am optimized for certain tasks and abilities. It's good to know that some people, like Dr. Silvers, agree with this assessment.
Dr. Silvers spoke negatively of programs that seek to "raise statistical averages" to the detriment of individuals. This makes me think of how my high school had a program to send "troubled" students to a different school under the auspice of giving them a "more appropriate environment", but then this same school would claim a "99% graduation rate". There was nothing inherent about the school that encouraged students to stick with it and graduate rather than dropping out; it was just that they identified potential "dropouts" and quickly shuffled them off somewhere else before they could drop out and hurt the average. This sort of policy makes it all the more difficult for atypical, disabled, differently-enabled (or whatever word one finds most appropriate) individuals to find their niche in a particular environment, whether it be academic, career, or social. Diversity (which I would interpret as diversity that is acknowledged and "out in the open"), according to Silvers, discourages eugenics by encouraging accomodation of and recognition of the value of different traits as applied to particular roles.
Eugenics programs fail the pragmatic test by forcing biological properties to be sorted into "strengths and weaknesses", when this is a line that cannot be easily or realistically drawn -- except possibly in the case of sheer viability. (That is, I do not have any moral problems with modifying a fetus which would certainly die without such a modification on the basis that being alive is better than being dead!).
Dr. Silvers concluded by noting that many debates surrounding enhancement and disability assume that humans as a group are naturally competitive, or that competition is always (or should be) the Thing To Worry About when choosing one's life goals or bearing offspring. While there is certainly some competition inherent in human interactions, there are also numerous examples of cooperation. Living should not be about trying to be "better" than others or worrying that one must give one's children a "competitive advantage", but rather, thinking in terms of the potential for each person to fill a unique role and pursue unique goals.
Shannon Ramdin spoke next -- her presentation made extensive use of words like "hedgemony", which I admit made it somewhat difficult to follow. This talk was cautionary in the vein of Dr. Nigel Cameron's, at least in the sense of warning against technology being used as a means to power and having this power concentrated in a group known for its tendencies toward corruption. Ms. Ramdin noted that despite initial impressions of the Internet as being a sort of great equalizer, at present the Internet is only reflecting the lives of people who can afford computers and Internet access. She cautioned against assuming inherent goodness in technologies that "came out of" white male hedgemony and dominant paradigms.
A critique of Donna Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto was offered on the grounds that this writing exhibited excessive levels of "techno-optimism". Not having read the Cyborg Manifesto myself (something I will certainly need to remedy in the near future), I cannot comment specifically on the optimism or philosophies described in this essay, but I think I have a decent enough understanding of what "techno-optimism" might have meant in the context of Ms. Ramdin's presentation.
One point that I agreed wholeheartedly with Ramdin on is the fact that in order to succeed as a "broad ideological movement", transhumansim must necessarily embrace the "political paradigms of non-dominant groups". As much as I agree that periodic reminders of the existence of non-dominant groups are essential to any ideological movement that seeks to be inclusive of all conscious beings, I would argue that transhumanism is already quite cogent of the existence of, and right to exist of, non-dominant groups. After all, transhumanism is a non-dominant group. And as a person who is (a) female, and (b) legally and medically considered "disabled" to a certain extent (and I acknowledge that in some environments, such as noisy pubs or behind the wheel of a car, I am obviously and undeniably disabled), I have experienced nothing but benefit from the technologies I have chosen to make use of.
Computers, and the Internet especially, have enabled me to an extent that would not otherwise be possible. Regardless of whether any wealthy white males might be responsible for the invention of some technologies I benefit from, in no way does my participation in discussion online support the notion of a dominantly white-wealthy-male transhumanist paradigm. While it is important to keep historical records as to how certain technologies came to be, it makes little sense to me to dwell on the social origins of certain pices of technology. Though some degree of inequality persists when it comes to access to technology, one cannot deny the fact that basic computing functionality is becoming more and more accessible. And it doesn't really matter who invented what or where it came from -- the innovative tendencies and imagination of humans makes it possible for many people to look at something that exists and use it for something that its creators possibly never intended. Once an object or technology comes into being it is neutral, a tool, that people can and should be able to use without being locked into a particular notion of how that tool should be used based on its origins.
The accelerating rate of advancement in computing technology means that there is a lot of perfectly functional, but unused, hardware lying around (I've got a fair amount of it in my apartment). It's difficult to give this equipment away. One social program I've thought might be a tremendously positive investment would be a program to collect and distribute this recently-obsolete equipment to those who cannot afford computers. Some might suggest that the imbalance of power might still remain between those with the fastest, top-of-the-line computers and those with slightly older models, but surely, this imbalance would be much smaller. (Of course, there are still people in the world lacking electricity hookups and phone line access and basic sanitation, but my suggesting a computer-distribution project does not in any way imply that other, severe, social and political imbalances cannot and will not be addressed in parallel. One mistake I often encounter in assessments of up-and-coming technologies is the notion that things need to happen in a particular order, or not at all. This argument basically amounts to a potential mandate for people's career choices to be made for them on the basis of some organization's or government's idea of what the world needs most. This is both undesirable and unnecessary.)
I do not mean to come across as unduly critical of Ramdin's presentation -- I think it is extremely important for people to continue providing critiques and caveats of transhumanism, whatever their interpretation of transhumanism may be. Without these caveats and critiques, the potential for intellectual laziness and an inability to respond cogently to future critiques could be a danger. I do not believe that any philosophy or notion is beyond and above criticism, and reminding would-be enhancers, transhumanists, and the like that we must remain aware of the potential to hinder equality rather than foster it and take necessary steps to prevent this.
The final speaker on this panel was Jess Cadwallader, who focused on the subjectivity of suffering and the difficulty of using the concept of suffering as a basis for drawing ethical conclusions. Ms. Cadwallader pointed out that while suffering is often considered to be culture-independent (i.e., "natural"), the very category of "natural" is itself a construct defined and described within the framework of a culture. One astute observation here was that culture tends to define what can be observed and what can be expressed. I would suggest that this aspect of culture is part of what makes it difficult for some people to accurately and convincingly express themselves -- their experiences simply lie beyond current cultural constraints of language and associated vocabulary and even appearance.
When something happens that is not immediately recognizable, cultures tend to sort this unfamiliar happening into a pre-existing category that may in fact be only superficially appropriate (and therefore wholly inappropriate). Hence, some types of suffering may be completely missed or ignored, while other things might be interpreted as suffering when, in fact, they are not. I imagine that this phenomenon is responsible for some of the discrimination experienced by autistic people (who are often assumed to be lacking or suffering due to atypical body language or preferred activities) and the difficulty some injured or ill people have in obtaining appropriate pain management ("You don't look like you're in pain!").
Ms. Cadwallader introduced the idea of "Power Knowledge", and discussed three components of this:
1.) The body as "project": something to be worked on such that it expresses what the individual feels to be his or her true self. (An example that comes to mind here is that of a transgendered individual who undergoes surgery and hormone treatments such that the outer form is coherent with the inner form).
2.) The "Teleological Life Narrative", or tendency of people to see their lives as goal-directed.
3.) Notions of pathology, difference, and deviance.
Ms. Cadwallader suggested, as an example, "shortness" as a property that might conceivably result in the suffering of a child. However, depending on the cultural climate in which a child grows up, shortness might be considered advantageous or disadvantageous, beautiful or ugly. For a parent to make the choice of, say, height enhancement on the basis that shortness will result in suffering opens up quite a realm of potential debate. By refusing to bring a person into the world who will fall within a certain percentile of height, the percentile itself will be shifted over time. The ethical question here is primarily one of whether it is more dangerous to bring a person into the world knowing that person may suffer for their deviance from a cultural norm, or whether not bringing a statistically-atypical person into being promotes a society that holds ever-narrowing views as to what sort of person is allowed to exist.
I personally think there is no question that "normative" or primarily mainstream-competitive "enhancements" (such as height alteration or certain sorts of neurological alteration) would be a terrible thing -- though some individuals may suffer for being different, it seems that any parent who seeks to produce an average child who will somehow be granted immunity to prejudice on the basis of having an appearance and ability set that does not offend the sensibilities of the dominant cultural group is taking the "lazy" way out. With a truly supportive family, there is no reason that anyone has to suffer, regardless of how different from supposed norms they may be. I often encounter a similar argument in discussions of autism -- some parents would remove their child's most harmless quirks if they had the choice, on the basis that these quirks prompt bullying -- this seems extremely misdirected to me, since it seems that it should be the bullies who are chastised and urged to change rather than their victims.
Ms. Cadwallader noted in closing (or at least, where my notes on this presentation end -- this segment of my article may be expanded upon if I can find the audio for this presentation) that it is important to acknowledge that freedom, choice, health, and notions of 'enhancement' occur within a culture. And this presentation brought to light the important caveat -- one I agree with more so than other caveats presented during this conference -- that we must take note of how contemporary procedures are being used toward the ends of "normalisation" and be wary of supporting philosophical definitions of suffering that encourage homogenization.
Sunday, May 28, 2006
IEET Conference - Comprehensive Report - Part 1
Introduction * Part 1 * Part 2 * Part 3 * Part 4 * Part 5
This entry represents Part 1 of a comprehensive report on the talks I attended at the Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights conference presented by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. The narrative presented here represents my own personal observations and interpretations of the event and the subject matter discussed therein, and I encourage anyone who reads this who was also in attendance to note any factual errors I may have made and to offer any criticisms of my responses that seem merited.
9:00 - 9:15 AM - Welcome & Opening Comments
Delivered by Dr. James Hughes, this brief introductory statement explained how transhumanism / enhancement / modification of human form and function could be framed as a rational extension of liberal, democratic ideals. The basis of human, transhuman, or personhood rights (and the definitions of these three terms were discussed and questioned throughout the day) was presented as "conscious existence", and a being with conscious existence has a basic right to self-determination.
However, in contrast to earlier models of transhumanism (such as Extropianism), this democratic transhumanism (sometimes referred to as, or alongside with, "tech progressivism") distinguishes itself by seeking to retain or emphasize cooperation, discussion, and the retention of governmental bodies for the good of individuals and common welfare. That is, Dr. Hughes seems to be taking the position that transhumanist and individual rights to self-determination need not be tied to a libertarian or anarchistic social model.
Hughes described a state in which basic rights start at the individual level and then work their way up -- the reasoning here being that healthier, happier people will in turn build and maintain a healthier, happier society (or at least, this is my interpretation -- if so, I really like this notion). In short, "society should enable individuals to meet their full potential".
9:15 - 10:45 AM - Enhancement & Human Rights
This was a panel moderated by Nick Bostrom, Ph.D. (whom I am familiar with mainly in terms of his being the author of The Fable of the Dragon-Tyrant). Panel members were Patrick Hopkins, Ph.D. whose talk was entitled "Why Human Rights Are A Problem For Enhancement", Chris Gray, PhD, who discussed "Cyborg Political Technologies", and Nigel Cameron, Ph.D. who delivered "Some Caveats For Enhancers".
Dr. Hopkins was primarily concerned with the questions of (a) whether humans can be said to possess a "fundamental right to enhancement", and if so, in which context can this right be defended? Three different possible bases for a right to enhancement were put forth:
1.) Nature or "natural law" basis, meaning that through some inherent property of whatever it means to be human, we might be said to have a sort of fundamental right to make use of technologies that assist in allowing us to meet various goals we might have.
2.) Interests, meaning that rights are fundamental due to their capacity to protect what we care about, while keeping in mind that exercising certain rights of our own may impose duties on others.
3.) Autonomy, meaning that individuals have the right to absolute liberty so long as exercising this liberty does not impose on the liberty of others -- a libertarian model, in other words, in which the structure of interaction between individual rights should be self-correcting. The Autonomy basis was described as the "most common" and "most flexible" argument given for a person's right to access enhancement technology.
Dr. Hopkins pointed out that "rights", particularly things described as "fundamental rights", are difficult to define seeing as they are invisible and intangible yet also considered by many to be self-evident. The problem of how an invisible, intangible construct can be viewed as fundamental contributes to the challenge of attempting to frame enhancement from a rights perspective. It was also noted that the establishment of certain rights as fundamental necessarily -- as it creates various freedoms -- also imposes certain restrictions and conditions on individuals and societies, and that the nature of these conditions and restrictions needs to be taken into consideration.
At the beginning of this talk, I was fairly supportive of the idea of using the Autonomy basis to justify access to enhancement (which should definitely not be construed as a mandate for people to undergo compulsory enhancement, or as a support for the idea that all possible enhancements should be provided free of charge). By the end, I was still hovering around this position, though Dr. Hopkins sought to make the point that the Interests basis was perhaps the most valid. He expressed some concern about the "fetishization of liberty" and the fact that there will always be some people who abuse freedoms if they are given for the sake of considering liberty as a value in and of itself. Some historical context was given for this -- in which it was noted that societies with a certain level of granted freedoms do tend to swing back to a reactionary mode after a time.
I can understand the support for the Interests position in the sense that, using this model, people are urged to consider (when seeking enhancement or modification): what good will this serve, for me, and for those around me? Rather than doing whatever one wants simply because one is legally permitted to do so, people who think in terms of interests are likely to make healthier choices. Philosophically, I do agree with this -- though I would not go so far as to attempt to legislate anything that would require individuals to prove or demonstrate a degree of "common good" or even immediate self-based good that would come of a particular enhancement. Rather, I would definitely attempt to educate people so that they would be enabled and empowered to make healthier choices. The example given by Hopkins of a destructive use of technology was the common sci-fi notion of "plugging in" to some device that constantly stimulated the brain's pleasure centers, producing a state of unrelenting bliss.
I do think that it would be a shame if everyone on the planet plugged into a device like this, but at the same time, I think that the chances of that actually happening would be quite slim. As much as human biology compels us to seek pleasure, I think that personality development figures very strongly into the likelihood of someone choosing escapism or productive living. I don't believe that there is any sort of physically-based pleasure signal that would satisfy me more than, say, reading a good book or figuring out an interesting puzzle. If such devices did exist, it is almost certain that some people would choose to "plug in" and stay there, but I am convinced that no matter how supposedly pleasurable it was, plenty of people would actually get bored and seek other kinds of pleasure. Rather than making such devices illegal, it seems that working to create a society that people do not feel compelled to escape from -- in which they are enabled and empowered to reach all sorts of productive goals -- would support both the Interests ideal philosophically, and the Autonomy ideal from a legislative standpoint.
The Nature basis was dismissed to a certain extent, or at least not discussed as comprehensively as the distinction between Interests and Autonomy, in part because the Nature basis commonly rests upon assumptions related to particular religious beliefs. However, Hopkins did not dismiss the possibility of defining and using a concept of a "human nature" or "person nature" -- he just noted that the basis for enhancement rights could not rest upon traditional or religious notions of this "nature". Closing statements suggested that when considering any individual enhancement or goal, it would be wise to consider whether the enhancement is geared toward "worthwhile and noble ends". At the individual level, I wholly agree with this, and believe that people should be encouraged to consider their choices carefully -- but this need not entail legislation that bans the very development of certain technologies, in my estimation.
Dr. Gray delivered a very colorful talk that first described "rights" as granted on the basis of what freedoms a person is willing to risk physically to obtain. This is a rather useful definition and certainly seems logical when viewed in terms of history -- over time, the ongoing struggle for freedom and autonomy has led to numerous persons risking their lives, jobs, and property for the sake of assuring liberties.
I had a bit more of a difficult time taking notes on Gray's presentation (and throughout this report, my descriptions and reactions to various talks will vary in their length and depth -- the sheer diversity of presentation styles made some much more conducive to note-taking than others, and plus, my non-cyborgified human hand simply needed a rest now and then!). The main point I got out of Gray's presentation was that culture itself may seem transparent to the citizen / person, but it is still there, forming a framework of what we do and think, and how we assess information. Concepts like rights, and liberty, and even knowledge must be recognized as products of what is most certainly a limited understanding of reality.
One thing I appreciated from this talk was that I finally got a clear sense of what Epistemology means -- the definition of this word makes a curious amount of sense when phrased as a question: How do we know what we know? Epistemology is crucial to keep in mind when attempting to make judgements based on what we think we know, because as Gray pointed out, "you cannot have perfect information". Mathematics, though it serves as a practical means for quantifying data and making comparisons, is not (as Gödel proved with his Incompleteness Theorems) a system devoid of the potential for contradiction. This was admittedly my first exposure to the notion of these Incompleteness Theorems in the formal sense, but I remember something along these lines from the film Labyrinth, when the protagonist Sara had to choose her direction in the maze based on some very confusing instructions from a pair of creatures -- one who always lies, and one who always tells the truth.
Gray pointed out that mathematics is one thing, but real life is quite another. He amused the audience by noting that if we were walking down the street and asked someone if they'd seen which way a thief went, our response to an answer like, "He went that way, but I always lie" would be, "You asshole!" at which point we'd go and ask someone who did not suffer from terminal asshattery.
Now, bringing this back to the notion of enhancement -- for which Gray invoked such terms as "cyborgification" and "participatory evolution" (and I'll admit a decided fondness for the phrase "participatory evolution") -- I got the impression that rather than directly making statements or judgements about specific enhancements and the ethics thereof, Gray was providing a particular way to think about the decision-making process associated with seeking enhancements or determining whether they are worthwhile in terms of whether one is willing to work or fight for a right to something in particular. One concept, again invoking the notion of epistemology, that Gray also noted was the fact that whenever we choose to know something, we are simultaneously choosing not to know something else.
I would extend this to enhancements as well, though Gray did not do this directly -- when a person chooses to gain a particular skill or device or modification, s/he is simultaneously choosing not to gain something else. This, I think is an important consideration for everyone, and it should also be pointed out that people already do this all the time, such as when they select a particular college major (at the exclusion of other majors) or have dinner in one restaurant rather than another. In contrast with some speakers, who seemed to attempt to lay out their points and explain all of them, Gray made points and statements that (at least for me) prompted a lot of tangential thoughts and the formation of a sort of mental list of "things I need to study up on". This, I would certainly say, is a positive outcome of having listened to a speech.
Next came Dr. Nigel Cameron, who was perhaps the most conservative speaker at the entire conference. In all honesty, I expected to disagree with him more than I did (though I really only agreed fully on one point) -- I was surprised and pleased to hear that he was "less concerned about life extension" and primarily concerned, in the negative sense, about possible implications of genetic alteration and cognitive enhancement. His talk focused on five caveats for would-be enhancers, and while I definitely disagreed with the apparent fatalism regarding human potential and tendencies put forth in these caveats, I think that his viewpoint importantly brought to the arena many of the concerns held by people who oppose enhancements and even transhumanism at large. That is, he served as a representative for the people transhumanists / tech progressives are likely to encounter in many contexts, who at least attempt to formally or academically deconstruct transhumanist arguments.
Firstly, Dr. Cameron said something I wholly agreed with -- that perhaps the term "enhancements" is too subjective and relative to properly describe the processes of genetic, physiological, or technological alterations of the human form and ability set. He suggested the term "interventions" might be better, and while "intervention" has a negative connotation to me for reasons entirely unrelated to transhumanism, in this context it does seem appropriate. The term "modifications" might also be suitable. Simply put, I agree that "enhancement" is indeed a non-neutral term and that it must be acknowledged that one person's enhancement is another person's disability -- and also that whether a given modification or intervention is even perceived by the individual as enhancement or detriment can be largely environmentally dependent. But for the purposes of this article, I will occasionally use the terms "enhancement", "intervention", and "modification" interchangeably, with the qualification that I do not necessarily consider an "enhancement" to be something definable in the value-sense by any agent outside a particular individual in a particular environment.
Secondly, Dr. Cameron's five caveats were introduced and explained.
1.) Human nature is "experientially flawed", and we "know" that we humans are flawed in our capacity to become blundering and corrupt. Cameron seems to espouse the "technology is power" viewpoint, and is concerned about its potential for use as what would amount to weaponry of mass destruction.
While I do think that it is important to keep the potential for corruption in mind when embarking on any endeavour that could result in abilities and capacities not originally held by a person or group, I do wonder what Dr. Cameron thinks of the notion that many transhumans, or posthumans, or otherwise-modified individuals consider the elimination or diminishing of corrupt tendencies to be a goal of posthuman existence. That is, yes, we will have more powerful technology but at the same time it is possible that modifications to brains and / or ethics-memes will make corruption, "blundering", and mass destruction far less likely.
2.) The "Lewis Paradox" -- here, Cameron invokes C.S. Lewis' The Abolition of Man. This caveat is a criticism of using "science in the wrong way, that is, to 'debunk' values." In a sense, I would interpret this caveat as a critique of postmodern relativism and attempts to bring decision-making out of real human experience (however one might define that) and into the realm of mechanistic means. Technology could very well be a "zero-sum gain" situation wherein by defending its proliferation, application, and availability, humans might end up losing their very existence in the process.
Again, this caveat -- while it does present what could be construed as a reasonable "reality check" in the flavor of Dr. Hopkins' suggestion that actions should be based on whether they are in our best interests -- rests on some very arbitrary assumptions that necessarily trace back to the idea of natural (or supernatural / religious) law and the utilization of such law for the definition of "human nature". I would argue that the attempts by some to justify technological advance and enhancement in no way lead to a society wholly devoid of values. It would seem that any means by which technology might be controlled, banned, or heavily restricted might entail means of control much more insidious than the very things that this control seeks to prevent.
3.) The "New Feudalism" concept -- continuing the theme of viewing technology as an embodiment as power, Cameron suggests that we look at the already-existing disparity between the "haves" and the "have-nots" when it comes to such things as computer technology. As technology advances further and further, more power will be placed into the hands of a smaller group of people over time.
Taken as a cautionary statement I have no issue with this, however, I do not see how it could be used as a basis for pre-emptive legislation. Disparities must be acknowledged, certainly, but there are ways to remedy such disparities without resorting to preventing the development or proliferation of technology. I would need to read up on history and world statistics in order to make a more definitive statement about the social equalization effects of technology, so I will not say more on this matter here, but I will say that I don't think that "feudalism" is an inevitable consequence of technology. As another speaker noted later in the day (and I will go into this further in the next chapter of this report), there is no reason to believe that competitiveness is a more primary defining attribute of humanity than cooperation.
4.) "Where Freedom Truly Lies" -- like Hopkins, Cameron warns against "radical and random notions of autonomy" and points out that a freedom in one context constitutes a restriction in another. Exercising a choice, after all, necessarily leads to a situation where other choices need not be made.
This point touches on some notions covered by both Dr. Hopkins and Dr. Gray, in the sense of making a philosophical statement regarding the application of rights to the arena of choice. Though I think that different people are likely to have very different ideas as to what constitutes "radical and random", I can see how it is indeed necessary to not go blindly into anything based on a superficial perception of the goodness of an action.
5.) This seemed to be, as far as I could tell, a "human nature"-based caveat. The phrase "This Human Thing" was invoked here, however, I think that Dr. Cameron needs to write a book or paper (or perhaps he already has) that describes "This Human Thing" coherently. As far as I could tell, "This Human Thing" was reminiscent of Francis Fukuyama's "Factor X", which supposedly represents an irreducible collection of traits or commonalities that make humans human. Cameron questioned whether his Human Thing could coexist with exponentially-advancing technology, and urged that transhumanists continue to question this as well.
The question-and-answer session following this set of talks included a very cogent point made by someone (who may have been Dr. Anders Sandberg -- if anyone reading this knows otherwise, please let me know, and I will correct the attribution) regarding the fact that human musculature has basically been rendered nearly irrelevant. That is, we can flick or twitch a finger and activate devices that hurtle along at great speeds (i.e., automobiles) or (more ominously) result in the explosion of massive bombs. I will need to locate and listen to the audio recorded during this discussion to comment further on it, but one thing I will say about the conference as a whole is that the discussion sessions could have been a bit longer, so as to allow the speakers to answer questions more completely. This is a minor picky point, though -- for the most part, the speakers were impressive in their ability to concisely offer responses without sacrificing accuracy. And as I commented to several people at the event, I observed a good level of intellectual integrity on the part of people when they were asked a question that would have required an answer beyond the scope of what the speaker had studied and considered pertaining to his or her topic of interest.
Stay tuned for the next installment of this report!
This entry represents Part 1 of a comprehensive report on the talks I attended at the Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights conference presented by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. The narrative presented here represents my own personal observations and interpretations of the event and the subject matter discussed therein, and I encourage anyone who reads this who was also in attendance to note any factual errors I may have made and to offer any criticisms of my responses that seem merited.
9:00 - 9:15 AM - Welcome & Opening Comments
Delivered by Dr. James Hughes, this brief introductory statement explained how transhumanism / enhancement / modification of human form and function could be framed as a rational extension of liberal, democratic ideals. The basis of human, transhuman, or personhood rights (and the definitions of these three terms were discussed and questioned throughout the day) was presented as "conscious existence", and a being with conscious existence has a basic right to self-determination.
However, in contrast to earlier models of transhumanism (such as Extropianism), this democratic transhumanism (sometimes referred to as, or alongside with, "tech progressivism") distinguishes itself by seeking to retain or emphasize cooperation, discussion, and the retention of governmental bodies for the good of individuals and common welfare. That is, Dr. Hughes seems to be taking the position that transhumanist and individual rights to self-determination need not be tied to a libertarian or anarchistic social model.
Hughes described a state in which basic rights start at the individual level and then work their way up -- the reasoning here being that healthier, happier people will in turn build and maintain a healthier, happier society (or at least, this is my interpretation -- if so, I really like this notion). In short, "society should enable individuals to meet their full potential".
9:15 - 10:45 AM - Enhancement & Human Rights
This was a panel moderated by Nick Bostrom, Ph.D. (whom I am familiar with mainly in terms of his being the author of The Fable of the Dragon-Tyrant). Panel members were Patrick Hopkins, Ph.D. whose talk was entitled "Why Human Rights Are A Problem For Enhancement", Chris Gray, PhD, who discussed "Cyborg Political Technologies", and Nigel Cameron, Ph.D. who delivered "Some Caveats For Enhancers".
Dr. Hopkins was primarily concerned with the questions of (a) whether humans can be said to possess a "fundamental right to enhancement", and if so, in which context can this right be defended? Three different possible bases for a right to enhancement were put forth:
1.) Nature or "natural law" basis, meaning that through some inherent property of whatever it means to be human, we might be said to have a sort of fundamental right to make use of technologies that assist in allowing us to meet various goals we might have.
2.) Interests, meaning that rights are fundamental due to their capacity to protect what we care about, while keeping in mind that exercising certain rights of our own may impose duties on others.
3.) Autonomy, meaning that individuals have the right to absolute liberty so long as exercising this liberty does not impose on the liberty of others -- a libertarian model, in other words, in which the structure of interaction between individual rights should be self-correcting. The Autonomy basis was described as the "most common" and "most flexible" argument given for a person's right to access enhancement technology.
Dr. Hopkins pointed out that "rights", particularly things described as "fundamental rights", are difficult to define seeing as they are invisible and intangible yet also considered by many to be self-evident. The problem of how an invisible, intangible construct can be viewed as fundamental contributes to the challenge of attempting to frame enhancement from a rights perspective. It was also noted that the establishment of certain rights as fundamental necessarily -- as it creates various freedoms -- also imposes certain restrictions and conditions on individuals and societies, and that the nature of these conditions and restrictions needs to be taken into consideration.
At the beginning of this talk, I was fairly supportive of the idea of using the Autonomy basis to justify access to enhancement (which should definitely not be construed as a mandate for people to undergo compulsory enhancement, or as a support for the idea that all possible enhancements should be provided free of charge). By the end, I was still hovering around this position, though Dr. Hopkins sought to make the point that the Interests basis was perhaps the most valid. He expressed some concern about the "fetishization of liberty" and the fact that there will always be some people who abuse freedoms if they are given for the sake of considering liberty as a value in and of itself. Some historical context was given for this -- in which it was noted that societies with a certain level of granted freedoms do tend to swing back to a reactionary mode after a time.
I can understand the support for the Interests position in the sense that, using this model, people are urged to consider (when seeking enhancement or modification): what good will this serve, for me, and for those around me? Rather than doing whatever one wants simply because one is legally permitted to do so, people who think in terms of interests are likely to make healthier choices. Philosophically, I do agree with this -- though I would not go so far as to attempt to legislate anything that would require individuals to prove or demonstrate a degree of "common good" or even immediate self-based good that would come of a particular enhancement. Rather, I would definitely attempt to educate people so that they would be enabled and empowered to make healthier choices. The example given by Hopkins of a destructive use of technology was the common sci-fi notion of "plugging in" to some device that constantly stimulated the brain's pleasure centers, producing a state of unrelenting bliss.
I do think that it would be a shame if everyone on the planet plugged into a device like this, but at the same time, I think that the chances of that actually happening would be quite slim. As much as human biology compels us to seek pleasure, I think that personality development figures very strongly into the likelihood of someone choosing escapism or productive living. I don't believe that there is any sort of physically-based pleasure signal that would satisfy me more than, say, reading a good book or figuring out an interesting puzzle. If such devices did exist, it is almost certain that some people would choose to "plug in" and stay there, but I am convinced that no matter how supposedly pleasurable it was, plenty of people would actually get bored and seek other kinds of pleasure. Rather than making such devices illegal, it seems that working to create a society that people do not feel compelled to escape from -- in which they are enabled and empowered to reach all sorts of productive goals -- would support both the Interests ideal philosophically, and the Autonomy ideal from a legislative standpoint.
The Nature basis was dismissed to a certain extent, or at least not discussed as comprehensively as the distinction between Interests and Autonomy, in part because the Nature basis commonly rests upon assumptions related to particular religious beliefs. However, Hopkins did not dismiss the possibility of defining and using a concept of a "human nature" or "person nature" -- he just noted that the basis for enhancement rights could not rest upon traditional or religious notions of this "nature". Closing statements suggested that when considering any individual enhancement or goal, it would be wise to consider whether the enhancement is geared toward "worthwhile and noble ends". At the individual level, I wholly agree with this, and believe that people should be encouraged to consider their choices carefully -- but this need not entail legislation that bans the very development of certain technologies, in my estimation.
Dr. Gray delivered a very colorful talk that first described "rights" as granted on the basis of what freedoms a person is willing to risk physically to obtain. This is a rather useful definition and certainly seems logical when viewed in terms of history -- over time, the ongoing struggle for freedom and autonomy has led to numerous persons risking their lives, jobs, and property for the sake of assuring liberties.
I had a bit more of a difficult time taking notes on Gray's presentation (and throughout this report, my descriptions and reactions to various talks will vary in their length and depth -- the sheer diversity of presentation styles made some much more conducive to note-taking than others, and plus, my non-cyborgified human hand simply needed a rest now and then!). The main point I got out of Gray's presentation was that culture itself may seem transparent to the citizen / person, but it is still there, forming a framework of what we do and think, and how we assess information. Concepts like rights, and liberty, and even knowledge must be recognized as products of what is most certainly a limited understanding of reality.
One thing I appreciated from this talk was that I finally got a clear sense of what Epistemology means -- the definition of this word makes a curious amount of sense when phrased as a question: How do we know what we know? Epistemology is crucial to keep in mind when attempting to make judgements based on what we think we know, because as Gray pointed out, "you cannot have perfect information". Mathematics, though it serves as a practical means for quantifying data and making comparisons, is not (as Gödel proved with his Incompleteness Theorems) a system devoid of the potential for contradiction. This was admittedly my first exposure to the notion of these Incompleteness Theorems in the formal sense, but I remember something along these lines from the film Labyrinth, when the protagonist Sara had to choose her direction in the maze based on some very confusing instructions from a pair of creatures -- one who always lies, and one who always tells the truth.
Gray pointed out that mathematics is one thing, but real life is quite another. He amused the audience by noting that if we were walking down the street and asked someone if they'd seen which way a thief went, our response to an answer like, "He went that way, but I always lie" would be, "You asshole!" at which point we'd go and ask someone who did not suffer from terminal asshattery.
Now, bringing this back to the notion of enhancement -- for which Gray invoked such terms as "cyborgification" and "participatory evolution" (and I'll admit a decided fondness for the phrase "participatory evolution") -- I got the impression that rather than directly making statements or judgements about specific enhancements and the ethics thereof, Gray was providing a particular way to think about the decision-making process associated with seeking enhancements or determining whether they are worthwhile in terms of whether one is willing to work or fight for a right to something in particular. One concept, again invoking the notion of epistemology, that Gray also noted was the fact that whenever we choose to know something, we are simultaneously choosing not to know something else.
I would extend this to enhancements as well, though Gray did not do this directly -- when a person chooses to gain a particular skill or device or modification, s/he is simultaneously choosing not to gain something else. This, I think is an important consideration for everyone, and it should also be pointed out that people already do this all the time, such as when they select a particular college major (at the exclusion of other majors) or have dinner in one restaurant rather than another. In contrast with some speakers, who seemed to attempt to lay out their points and explain all of them, Gray made points and statements that (at least for me) prompted a lot of tangential thoughts and the formation of a sort of mental list of "things I need to study up on". This, I would certainly say, is a positive outcome of having listened to a speech.
Next came Dr. Nigel Cameron, who was perhaps the most conservative speaker at the entire conference. In all honesty, I expected to disagree with him more than I did (though I really only agreed fully on one point) -- I was surprised and pleased to hear that he was "less concerned about life extension" and primarily concerned, in the negative sense, about possible implications of genetic alteration and cognitive enhancement. His talk focused on five caveats for would-be enhancers, and while I definitely disagreed with the apparent fatalism regarding human potential and tendencies put forth in these caveats, I think that his viewpoint importantly brought to the arena many of the concerns held by people who oppose enhancements and even transhumanism at large. That is, he served as a representative for the people transhumanists / tech progressives are likely to encounter in many contexts, who at least attempt to formally or academically deconstruct transhumanist arguments.
Firstly, Dr. Cameron said something I wholly agreed with -- that perhaps the term "enhancements" is too subjective and relative to properly describe the processes of genetic, physiological, or technological alterations of the human form and ability set. He suggested the term "interventions" might be better, and while "intervention" has a negative connotation to me for reasons entirely unrelated to transhumanism, in this context it does seem appropriate. The term "modifications" might also be suitable. Simply put, I agree that "enhancement" is indeed a non-neutral term and that it must be acknowledged that one person's enhancement is another person's disability -- and also that whether a given modification or intervention is even perceived by the individual as enhancement or detriment can be largely environmentally dependent. But for the purposes of this article, I will occasionally use the terms "enhancement", "intervention", and "modification" interchangeably, with the qualification that I do not necessarily consider an "enhancement" to be something definable in the value-sense by any agent outside a particular individual in a particular environment.
Secondly, Dr. Cameron's five caveats were introduced and explained.
1.) Human nature is "experientially flawed", and we "know" that we humans are flawed in our capacity to become blundering and corrupt. Cameron seems to espouse the "technology is power" viewpoint, and is concerned about its potential for use as what would amount to weaponry of mass destruction.
While I do think that it is important to keep the potential for corruption in mind when embarking on any endeavour that could result in abilities and capacities not originally held by a person or group, I do wonder what Dr. Cameron thinks of the notion that many transhumans, or posthumans, or otherwise-modified individuals consider the elimination or diminishing of corrupt tendencies to be a goal of posthuman existence. That is, yes, we will have more powerful technology but at the same time it is possible that modifications to brains and / or ethics-memes will make corruption, "blundering", and mass destruction far less likely.
2.) The "Lewis Paradox" -- here, Cameron invokes C.S. Lewis' The Abolition of Man. This caveat is a criticism of using "science in the wrong way, that is, to 'debunk' values." In a sense, I would interpret this caveat as a critique of postmodern relativism and attempts to bring decision-making out of real human experience (however one might define that) and into the realm of mechanistic means. Technology could very well be a "zero-sum gain" situation wherein by defending its proliferation, application, and availability, humans might end up losing their very existence in the process.
Again, this caveat -- while it does present what could be construed as a reasonable "reality check" in the flavor of Dr. Hopkins' suggestion that actions should be based on whether they are in our best interests -- rests on some very arbitrary assumptions that necessarily trace back to the idea of natural (or supernatural / religious) law and the utilization of such law for the definition of "human nature". I would argue that the attempts by some to justify technological advance and enhancement in no way lead to a society wholly devoid of values. It would seem that any means by which technology might be controlled, banned, or heavily restricted might entail means of control much more insidious than the very things that this control seeks to prevent.
3.) The "New Feudalism" concept -- continuing the theme of viewing technology as an embodiment as power, Cameron suggests that we look at the already-existing disparity between the "haves" and the "have-nots" when it comes to such things as computer technology. As technology advances further and further, more power will be placed into the hands of a smaller group of people over time.
Taken as a cautionary statement I have no issue with this, however, I do not see how it could be used as a basis for pre-emptive legislation. Disparities must be acknowledged, certainly, but there are ways to remedy such disparities without resorting to preventing the development or proliferation of technology. I would need to read up on history and world statistics in order to make a more definitive statement about the social equalization effects of technology, so I will not say more on this matter here, but I will say that I don't think that "feudalism" is an inevitable consequence of technology. As another speaker noted later in the day (and I will go into this further in the next chapter of this report), there is no reason to believe that competitiveness is a more primary defining attribute of humanity than cooperation.
4.) "Where Freedom Truly Lies" -- like Hopkins, Cameron warns against "radical and random notions of autonomy" and points out that a freedom in one context constitutes a restriction in another. Exercising a choice, after all, necessarily leads to a situation where other choices need not be made.
This point touches on some notions covered by both Dr. Hopkins and Dr. Gray, in the sense of making a philosophical statement regarding the application of rights to the arena of choice. Though I think that different people are likely to have very different ideas as to what constitutes "radical and random", I can see how it is indeed necessary to not go blindly into anything based on a superficial perception of the goodness of an action.
5.) This seemed to be, as far as I could tell, a "human nature"-based caveat. The phrase "This Human Thing" was invoked here, however, I think that Dr. Cameron needs to write a book or paper (or perhaps he already has) that describes "This Human Thing" coherently. As far as I could tell, "This Human Thing" was reminiscent of Francis Fukuyama's "Factor X", which supposedly represents an irreducible collection of traits or commonalities that make humans human. Cameron questioned whether his Human Thing could coexist with exponentially-advancing technology, and urged that transhumanists continue to question this as well.
The question-and-answer session following this set of talks included a very cogent point made by someone (who may have been Dr. Anders Sandberg -- if anyone reading this knows otherwise, please let me know, and I will correct the attribution) regarding the fact that human musculature has basically been rendered nearly irrelevant. That is, we can flick or twitch a finger and activate devices that hurtle along at great speeds (i.e., automobiles) or (more ominously) result in the explosion of massive bombs. I will need to locate and listen to the audio recorded during this discussion to comment further on it, but one thing I will say about the conference as a whole is that the discussion sessions could have been a bit longer, so as to allow the speakers to answer questions more completely. This is a minor picky point, though -- for the most part, the speakers were impressive in their ability to concisely offer responses without sacrificing accuracy. And as I commented to several people at the event, I observed a good level of intellectual integrity on the part of people when they were asked a question that would have required an answer beyond the scope of what the speaker had studied and considered pertaining to his or her topic of interest.
Stay tuned for the next installment of this report!
IEET Conference - Preliminary Report
Introduction * Part 1 * Part 2 * Part 3 * Part 4 * Part 5
This is a preliminary report on the Saturday session of the IEET Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights conference, which I attended today at Stanford University. Later entries will go more deeply into specifics and responses to some of the ideas and arguments presented during the talks, however, this entry is intended to give the basic impressions of what turned out to be one of the most intriguing Saturdays I've ever experienced.
I arrived at Stanford at 8:00 AM, and found that the campus area around the law school building (where the conference was held) was quite deserted, save for a few people setting up coffee and bagels. Registration was simple, and consisted of my giving my name and being handed a name tag. I wandered around for a bit, briefly talking to a few people (the question of how to spell "decaf" came up), and eventually settled into one of the surprisingly comfortable chairs in Room 190. A few people introduced themselves at random; one thing I found rather amusing / interesting from a sociological standpoint was the sense of not having an "affiliation" to claim. My name tag just said my name on it, and when introducing myself, there were these brief silences that ensued after giving my name. Practically everyone I talked to was either affiliated with an organization or somehow involved in a particular formal academic role. Eventually, I wrote "Electrical Engineer and Curious Person" on my badge beneath my name, because, well, that's what I am!
Whatever the credentials of the speakers and attendees, the overall atmosphere was one of egalitarianism. Despite the fact that some talks focused on the potential competitiveness inherent in human nature, I noted a definite sense of cooperation, even between those whose viewpoints were somewhat in opposition. That is, everyone who came seemed to have the same goal: to bring up ideas and possible ethical frameworks for decision-making. I quite honestly feel now that just having attended this sort of meeting-of-minds may in itself constitute some sort of "enhancement" (or at least, modification -- one of the things I took away from this conference was a certain sense of discomfort with the idea of using the word "enhancement" when the things described as enhancements may be largely subjective in terms of their benefit for the individual. But that is a digression I will have to follow up on later). But one thing is certain -- there are neural connections in my brain that did not exist this morning, and for that, I am compelled to thank everyone who spoke and conversed.
I took lots and lots of notes. These will hopefully allow me to review and process many of the ideas that were brought up and explored, but that will have to wait until tomorrow when my full neural faculties are back online. As noted, I had a wonderful and intriguing day, but it was also quite an energy expenditure in terms of dealing with information and stimulus overload. Well worth it, but I am definitely (as predicted) too tired to attend the Sunday session. I will most definitely be seeking the audio for the Sunday portion of the conference, as well as the end of the Q&A session that I missed tonight due to taking the 9:30 ending time literally and having my ride outside waiting for me at precisely that time. (That session included Aubrey deGrey and Walter Truett Anderson, and I'm rather sorry I did not plan better for the possibility that the conference might extend beyond its stated ending time. But again, I'm hoping to be able to obtain a recording of what went on after I left).
The cross-section of attendees was quite diverse. I was pleased to see that there was a reasonable number of fellow females there; I'd (perhaps ignorantly) predicted that this would not be the case. One thing I found interesting was having lunch at what turned into a Girl's Table -- that NEVER happened to me in junior high (if anyone was willing to sit with me then, it was usually the boys). I loved the sense of being among people who were all very interested in the sorts of things I think about constantly -- over lunch I discussed morphological and neurological diversity with Nikki Sullivan and Susan Stryker and two other people who I did not get the names of but who assisted with the promotion of and setup for the conference on behalf of the IEET (I hope I have my facts correct here).
EDIT: In my post on gender, I did comment that I did not usually classify people primarily along gender lines, and I do not. However, I have been compelled to think much more about gender lately since though I've never thought it to be particularly imporant, many people do, and it comes up in discussion often enough that it's become interesting to me from a sociologial standpoint.
I met George Dvorsky and found him to be a very pleasant fellow -- quite the gentleman and as smart in real life as he is on the Internet. (Though I apologize again for not being able to say that his presentation was particularly radical -- as I'm a neurodiversity advocate and life-extensionist, you have to get pretty darn radical to faze me at all these days.)
I also decided today that whatever I may be, a journalist I am not -- at least not the sort that takes lots and lots of pictures. I brought my camera but only took a few shots, since it didn't really seem that the main substance of the conference was anything that could really be captured in a still digital image. As a point of general principle, I don't like taking pictures of people when they're up in front of a room speaking, mainly because I figure the moment I chose to take the picture they'd probably end up getting blinded by the flash and going, "Aaaaaa!" and dropping their notes or something. (I have a decided knack for rather poor social timing and getting in the way of where people are trying to walk, but happily, that didn't come too much into play today.)
Hopefully I'm not repeating myself too much here, but seriously, it was wonderful to just be able to start conversations RIGHT at the interesting stuff without worrying about preliminaries. I could just turn around and start yammering at whoever was behind me about some aspect of genetics or biology or ethics or a combination of those, and they'd actually engage in very interesting discourse. This was a definite example of a situation in which my supposed "narrow obsessive interests" did not pose a social disadvantage, but rather the opposite. The notion of shared context is not something I experience much at all outside the realm of Internet communication, so having that in real-time and physical proximity was extremely interesting and just as joyfully surreal as I'd expected.
So, there will be much more on this but for now it is bedtime.
This is a preliminary report on the Saturday session of the IEET Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights conference, which I attended today at Stanford University. Later entries will go more deeply into specifics and responses to some of the ideas and arguments presented during the talks, however, this entry is intended to give the basic impressions of what turned out to be one of the most intriguing Saturdays I've ever experienced.
I arrived at Stanford at 8:00 AM, and found that the campus area around the law school building (where the conference was held) was quite deserted, save for a few people setting up coffee and bagels. Registration was simple, and consisted of my giving my name and being handed a name tag. I wandered around for a bit, briefly talking to a few people (the question of how to spell "decaf" came up), and eventually settled into one of the surprisingly comfortable chairs in Room 190. A few people introduced themselves at random; one thing I found rather amusing / interesting from a sociological standpoint was the sense of not having an "affiliation" to claim. My name tag just said my name on it, and when introducing myself, there were these brief silences that ensued after giving my name. Practically everyone I talked to was either affiliated with an organization or somehow involved in a particular formal academic role. Eventually, I wrote "Electrical Engineer and Curious Person" on my badge beneath my name, because, well, that's what I am!
Whatever the credentials of the speakers and attendees, the overall atmosphere was one of egalitarianism. Despite the fact that some talks focused on the potential competitiveness inherent in human nature, I noted a definite sense of cooperation, even between those whose viewpoints were somewhat in opposition. That is, everyone who came seemed to have the same goal: to bring up ideas and possible ethical frameworks for decision-making. I quite honestly feel now that just having attended this sort of meeting-of-minds may in itself constitute some sort of "enhancement" (or at least, modification -- one of the things I took away from this conference was a certain sense of discomfort with the idea of using the word "enhancement" when the things described as enhancements may be largely subjective in terms of their benefit for the individual. But that is a digression I will have to follow up on later). But one thing is certain -- there are neural connections in my brain that did not exist this morning, and for that, I am compelled to thank everyone who spoke and conversed.
I took lots and lots of notes. These will hopefully allow me to review and process many of the ideas that were brought up and explored, but that will have to wait until tomorrow when my full neural faculties are back online. As noted, I had a wonderful and intriguing day, but it was also quite an energy expenditure in terms of dealing with information and stimulus overload. Well worth it, but I am definitely (as predicted) too tired to attend the Sunday session. I will most definitely be seeking the audio for the Sunday portion of the conference, as well as the end of the Q&A session that I missed tonight due to taking the 9:30 ending time literally and having my ride outside waiting for me at precisely that time. (That session included Aubrey deGrey and Walter Truett Anderson, and I'm rather sorry I did not plan better for the possibility that the conference might extend beyond its stated ending time. But again, I'm hoping to be able to obtain a recording of what went on after I left).
The cross-section of attendees was quite diverse. I was pleased to see that there was a reasonable number of fellow females there; I'd (perhaps ignorantly) predicted that this would not be the case. One thing I found interesting was having lunch at what turned into a Girl's Table -- that NEVER happened to me in junior high (if anyone was willing to sit with me then, it was usually the boys). I loved the sense of being among people who were all very interested in the sorts of things I think about constantly -- over lunch I discussed morphological and neurological diversity with Nikki Sullivan and Susan Stryker and two other people who I did not get the names of but who assisted with the promotion of and setup for the conference on behalf of the IEET (I hope I have my facts correct here).
EDIT: In my post on gender, I did comment that I did not usually classify people primarily along gender lines, and I do not. However, I have been compelled to think much more about gender lately since though I've never thought it to be particularly imporant, many people do, and it comes up in discussion often enough that it's become interesting to me from a sociologial standpoint.
I met George Dvorsky and found him to be a very pleasant fellow -- quite the gentleman and as smart in real life as he is on the Internet. (Though I apologize again for not being able to say that his presentation was particularly radical -- as I'm a neurodiversity advocate and life-extensionist, you have to get pretty darn radical to faze me at all these days.)
I also decided today that whatever I may be, a journalist I am not -- at least not the sort that takes lots and lots of pictures. I brought my camera but only took a few shots, since it didn't really seem that the main substance of the conference was anything that could really be captured in a still digital image. As a point of general principle, I don't like taking pictures of people when they're up in front of a room speaking, mainly because I figure the moment I chose to take the picture they'd probably end up getting blinded by the flash and going, "Aaaaaa!" and dropping their notes or something. (I have a decided knack for rather poor social timing and getting in the way of where people are trying to walk, but happily, that didn't come too much into play today.)
Hopefully I'm not repeating myself too much here, but seriously, it was wonderful to just be able to start conversations RIGHT at the interesting stuff without worrying about preliminaries. I could just turn around and start yammering at whoever was behind me about some aspect of genetics or biology or ethics or a combination of those, and they'd actually engage in very interesting discourse. This was a definite example of a situation in which my supposed "narrow obsessive interests" did not pose a social disadvantage, but rather the opposite. The notion of shared context is not something I experience much at all outside the realm of Internet communication, so having that in real-time and physical proximity was extremely interesting and just as joyfully surreal as I'd expected.
So, there will be much more on this but for now it is bedtime.
Friday, May 26, 2006
Adventure
Tomorrow, for approximately 13 hours, I will be at Stanford University in Palo Alto, CA attending the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies "Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights" conference.
This certainly represents an adventure for me -- quite honestly, I'm the sort of person who Doesn't Get Out Much. But I am extremely excited about this conference, and will be writing as extensively as possible about it when I return. I will bring my camera as well, though I'm not sure what I'm going to be taking pictures of -- maybe the sorts of people I'm likely to share the future with if all goes well?
That's something I'm incredibly curious about, actually. I think, and write, and talk all the time about the incredible potential we have as sentient beings to deliberately evolve, and I've communicated with a few people online who seem similarly enthused. But I have no idea what they're like in person. I suppose I'll find out tomorrow in some regards.
I decided to attend this conference a few weeks ago when I was sitting at my desk at work, thinking about, well, the future. A lot of this "transhumanist stuff" still feels almost dreamlike when I think about it, mainly because while I have found a few like-minded folks online, I haven't actually seen any of them.
And while I truly believe in the existence of Internet People -- that is, I believe that there are real humans behind the text I read, I expect it will be a wonderfully surreal experience to actually be in the same room as people who are likely to, say, seriously consider cryonics...or bionic eyes that allow us to see the extremes of the electromagnetic spectrum...or extremely long lives that actually allow us to see projects through and reflect upon eons of history.
So, here's to new adventures. Next entry will be a report on the conference.
This certainly represents an adventure for me -- quite honestly, I'm the sort of person who Doesn't Get Out Much. But I am extremely excited about this conference, and will be writing as extensively as possible about it when I return. I will bring my camera as well, though I'm not sure what I'm going to be taking pictures of -- maybe the sorts of people I'm likely to share the future with if all goes well?
That's something I'm incredibly curious about, actually. I think, and write, and talk all the time about the incredible potential we have as sentient beings to deliberately evolve, and I've communicated with a few people online who seem similarly enthused. But I have no idea what they're like in person. I suppose I'll find out tomorrow in some regards.
I decided to attend this conference a few weeks ago when I was sitting at my desk at work, thinking about, well, the future. A lot of this "transhumanist stuff" still feels almost dreamlike when I think about it, mainly because while I have found a few like-minded folks online, I haven't actually seen any of them.
And while I truly believe in the existence of Internet People -- that is, I believe that there are real humans behind the text I read, I expect it will be a wonderfully surreal experience to actually be in the same room as people who are likely to, say, seriously consider cryonics...or bionic eyes that allow us to see the extremes of the electromagnetic spectrum...or extremely long lives that actually allow us to see projects through and reflect upon eons of history.
So, here's to new adventures. Next entry will be a report on the conference.
Sunday, May 21, 2006
The Ethical and the Natural -- Enhancement, Progress, and Responsible Decision-Making
Debates surrounding human enhancement and technological progress seem to be polarized, in part, on the basis of two conflicting definitions of natural:
1. That "Natural" refers to phenomena which would happen in the absence of human action or conscious volition.
2. That "natural" can be interpreted as basically anything that happens or comes into being as a result of life.
EDIT: Actually, I realize that I botched the second definition here -- rocks and volcanoes and weather and the formation of planets and stars are all "natural" but not "alive" or a result of life. I guess I'm just trying to say that I'd include "life" and the actions taken by living things under the umbrella of "natural". Or rather, I don't think the fact that something happens due to conscious volition of a sentient being somehow makes it unnatural.
Transhumanists and technological progressives would probably more commonly adhere to the second definition offered above. I once brought this second definition up during a discussion about the ethics of radical life extension, only to have someone inform me that using that particular definition was "nonproductive" and that it should basically have been obvious to me that the person I'd been debating with had an entirely different understanding of what "natural" meant.
I was rather surprised to hear this, because I quite honestly came to the second definition of "natural" and had no intention of playing what was referred to as semantic games in the discussion. Nevertheless, whether I intended "semantic games" or not, this is how it came across and I definitely thing it is important to address the issue of defining "natural" and possibly invoking other terms that may be more appropriate so as to avoid the confusion of using a word that means one thing in a particular person's lexicon, but something quite different in another person's lexicon.
As for the first definition above, I don't know of a better word to use than natural, but I do understand and, in essence, respect this definition and I think it has a place in terms of describing a certain class of phenomena. I will refer to this, for the sake of this discussion, as Nature (with a capital "N") while I'll refer to the second definition as "nature". The proper noun in the first case indicates the sense of reverence I've noted in some people when they come to their beliefs about what humans should and should not attempt to influence. These people are the ones likely to espouse what I've heard referred to as "deep ecology porn" -- the idea that, all things considered, the biosphere and possibly even the Universe would be better off without human influence. In a sense, this attitude evokes notions of guilt and original sin -- the viewpoint that a moral being must necessarily feel guilty for the inevitable disruption his or her existence presents to the surrounding ecology.
Now, as a transhumanist / technological progressive, I am extremely concerned about the environment, and do not deny that human influence can have (and has had) detrimental effects on the biosphere. I realize that a certain sort of balance is necessary for plants and animals (including humans) to survive and thrive, and that in some ways we have done grave harm to the Earth, and its lands and our fellow creatures. However, I don't think that this means that we should all commit mass suicide in this generation so that the biosphere can repair itself -- this would be just as illogical as saying that a person should kill themselves following a failed romantic relationship, or that you are obligated to knock down your entire house and start anew because you spilled a bucket of paint in the living room. There's no reason to apply absolutist and punitive responses to what should be a solvable problem.
I'm nearing the end of my third decade on this planet, and just in my lifetime I've seen a greatly increased cognizance of things like global warming, pollution, and waste. I remember recycling being dismissed as some kind of "hippie nonsense" by a lot of people back when I was in elementary school. I remember when people thought global warming was a hoax. I remember hearing quite a bit on the radio about how environmentalism was a threat to business. But now, there are large corporations realizing that they cannot wantonly pollute and that they are going to be held accountable for their effects on the biosphere. I work for one of these large corporations, and there is quite a bit of emphasis on, and encouragement of, environmental responsibility. The voices of those who noticed and pointed out the destruction of the environment are not going unheard, even by large, "impersonal" businesses. Not everyone has come around to an appropriate level of consciousness of these issues, but things are definitely getting better, not worse.
If things are getting better, then that should at least tell us that we as humans have the option, and the potential, to continue to progress technologically while at the same time being conscious of the effects of our influence and taking steps to mitigate harmful ramifications. This might indeed mean that we end up making a few mistakes and then cleaning up, but the solution to living peacefully with the rest of the ecosystem is not to eliminate our species. For all we know, human extinction might have serious and far-reaching detrimental effects that we could not possibly anticipate. Since we're here, and we're alive, the most positive solution seems to be to view our role on the Earth as something like that of a live-in caretaker. Yes, we benefit from being here and use resources to help us survive, but at the same time we think carefully about what we are doing, and why.
A call for technological progress must necessarily include a sense of responsibility. But it makes no sense to assume that, in all areas, we lack the appropriate judgement to exercise our conscious volition in a manner that is wise and beneficial. Just as humanity has the potential for evil and destruction, so do we also have the potential to plant forests and preserve wetlands and endangered animal species. When arguing about what is Natural, and assuming that respecting Nature is tantamount to non-interference, does it not follow that whatever we do consciously might therefore be construed as meddlesome?
As I interpret transhumanism, this philosophy would seem to suggest that not only are we as conscious beings capable of fixing our past mistakes, but also of making the world better and more hospitable to plants, animals, sub-ecosystems, and the overall biosphere. Right now, the world contains more evidence and examples of technological advancement than ever before -- but there are also areas that are far less polluted than previously. More technology, more progress, more knowledge, more exercising of human volition does not inevitably result in more destruction or even greater evidence of our supposed meddling.
Just as transhumanism can be applied in this way to environmental principles -- the idea that not only are we morally obligated to fix past transgressions but to look at means of avoiding similar mistakes in the future and working on ways to create a better and more hospitable earth for plants and animals alike -- it can be applied on the individual level, to individual sentient beings.
For instance, I am in favor of biotechnological and genetic research and the application of this research to the treatment of health problems and the enhancement of human experience. However, I do think that the focus of genetic and biotech should be on providing the opportunity for individuals to make choices in their own lives, not on imposing restrictions on what sorts of people are allowed to be born. As we apply environmental policies in a manner that integrates technology ethically into the biosphere (and recognizes that technology IS a part of the biosphere), we can also continue to learn the mechanisms behind and within living beings to enable individuals to help themselves and have greater control over their destiny than ever before.
Rather than assuming one has to be either a "bio-luddite" or a "eugenicist", it is better to evaluate issues on an individual basis and determine, on ethical grounds, what the best course of action would be. The solution to emerging technology, even risky technology, is not to avoid using it at all -- but rather to use it responsibly and cautiously.
For instance, it is one thing for a living person, who has gained a few years of experience in the world and made some decisions about their life goals, to decide that they'd like some sort of treatment or procedure that would enable him or her to run faster or store memories in a particular way. But it is quite another to attempt to genetically manipulate one's unborn offspring to form neural pathways at a particular rate, or grow to be a certain height, or have a certain skin color. A good cautionary principle in terms of genetic manipulation of any form might be: am I doing this because it will help me achieve my life goals, or because I am afraid or, or pandering to, some form of prejudice?
As I've noted before, I'm particularly concerned about the notion of possibly attempting to cure autism, and some have suggested that genetic research into the origins of autism should be focused on finding ways to deactivate these genes.
If we were successful at doing that, that would be a tragedy because the majority of challenges faced by autistic individuals are, in fact, prejudice-related rather than intrinsic.
A transhuman society that seeks to accept people who choose things like multiple extra limbs, green skin, eyeballs in very interesting places, super-accurate memory, and all sorts of other potential results of individually-defined enhancements (that will certainly necessitate biotechnological and / or genetic technology) must also be prepared to accept people who do not choose enhancements in any form, and people who are obviously autistic or disabled and who do not want to be cured. It doesn't make sense to suggest that people should be free to choose enhancements and that this is an expression of the respect of diversity, but that some things should be compulsory, and human society doesn't have room for some particular disabilities or differences.
Allowing autistic people to be born, and to opt to stay the way we are (for whatever that means) has nothing to do with the first, capital-N definition of Natural. It doesn't mean that we shouldn't "mess with Nature", it simply means that diversity and freedom need to encompass a much larger sphere than some might assume when first hearing about transhuman goals. In some ways, people on the autistic spectrum and with other things that are considered disabilities are actually optimized in certain ways for certain things.
People should most definitely feel free to assess their goals in life and choose post-birth enhancements that they feel would help them achieve these goals (or even things that come down to personal aesthetic preference, and there IS a difference between asserting an aesthetic preference and pandering to prejudice) -- but they should also respect that not everyone has the same goals or preferences. It is also extremely dangerous for an outside agent to start making judgements and assumptions about the subjective experience of another individual (i.e., "You don't know what you're missing!") This leads to the very sort of paternalistic thinking that transhumanism should seek to distance itself from.
After all, how do we know that rats don't pity us for lacking tails?
Right now my two main interests are transhumanism and autism, and in both these spheres of interest there seems to be a crowd of people who are intent on asserting that individuals do not have the right to judge and choose what is best for them. In the autism, or autistic, community, there are people who seek to champion cures and intensive treatments to supposedly eliminate the "tragedy" of the existence of autistic people. In the transhuman community (or at least in the "people who react to transhumanism" community), there are people who seek to suppress and halt efforts to extend the healthy human lifespan -- often on the basis of the assumption that individuals do not have the right to define the length of their own lives, because somehow their lives are going to be "less meaningful" and that people are going to "get bored".
It is striking how similar these arguments are -- the autism "curebies" as they're often referred to, and the anti life-extensionists. Both arguments are the assertion by an outside agent that because some individuals are not following a life path that meets someone's traditional idea of what a life should be, these people should have someone else's restrictions imposed on them, possibly by law. And in noting this similarity of argument, it is important to note that one might expect these groups to be enemies rather than allies, since one is seemingly championing the notion of little-n natural (the curebies, who would see science as an opportunity to "do whatever we can" to eliminate a certain type of person), and the other is thinking in terms of big-N Natural (the anti-life-extensionists, who see aging and death as an essential part of the human condition).
However, these two oppressive groups might not be united in their approach to defining natural -- but they are very closely united in the notion that all humans are somehow obligated to choose a particular kind of life and to be a particular kind of human, lest they risk not being permitted to adopt the mantle of "human" at all.
I still maintain that natural is something applicable to everything we do as human beings -- our consciousness and volition is the direct result of evolution and it is very natural for us to seek ways to increase our autonomy and transcend what we see as limits for our individual selves. And I also maintain that Natural -- when personified and referred to as a proper noun -- is not necessarily synonymous with "good". Aging and eventual death due to the effects of aging may be Natural, but to assert that this big-N Natural property somehow overrides the individual's desire not to die is unethical.
And respecting the rights of autistic people to exist as autistic people is not "good because it is Natural" but rather, good because it is ethical. Regardless of how a person defines natural and whether Nature is personified or viewed as an impersonal phenomenological force, it is clear that no definition is sufficient to allow us to be lax in determining the ethics of a situation.
Responsible transhumanism and technological progressive thought and policy seeks to consider cases of environmental effects and individual-level alteration not on the basis of whether it is natural in some sense, but whether it is good. And this is not easy, or quick, or something that can be figured out over a weekend. Rather it is to be an ongoing process of learning, discovering, discussing, assessing, and monitoring.
1. That "Natural" refers to phenomena which would happen in the absence of human action or conscious volition.
2. That "natural" can be interpreted as basically anything that happens or comes into being as a result of life.
EDIT: Actually, I realize that I botched the second definition here -- rocks and volcanoes and weather and the formation of planets and stars are all "natural" but not "alive" or a result of life. I guess I'm just trying to say that I'd include "life" and the actions taken by living things under the umbrella of "natural". Or rather, I don't think the fact that something happens due to conscious volition of a sentient being somehow makes it unnatural.
Transhumanists and technological progressives would probably more commonly adhere to the second definition offered above. I once brought this second definition up during a discussion about the ethics of radical life extension, only to have someone inform me that using that particular definition was "nonproductive" and that it should basically have been obvious to me that the person I'd been debating with had an entirely different understanding of what "natural" meant.
I was rather surprised to hear this, because I quite honestly came to the second definition of "natural" and had no intention of playing what was referred to as semantic games in the discussion. Nevertheless, whether I intended "semantic games" or not, this is how it came across and I definitely thing it is important to address the issue of defining "natural" and possibly invoking other terms that may be more appropriate so as to avoid the confusion of using a word that means one thing in a particular person's lexicon, but something quite different in another person's lexicon.
As for the first definition above, I don't know of a better word to use than natural, but I do understand and, in essence, respect this definition and I think it has a place in terms of describing a certain class of phenomena. I will refer to this, for the sake of this discussion, as Nature (with a capital "N") while I'll refer to the second definition as "nature". The proper noun in the first case indicates the sense of reverence I've noted in some people when they come to their beliefs about what humans should and should not attempt to influence. These people are the ones likely to espouse what I've heard referred to as "deep ecology porn" -- the idea that, all things considered, the biosphere and possibly even the Universe would be better off without human influence. In a sense, this attitude evokes notions of guilt and original sin -- the viewpoint that a moral being must necessarily feel guilty for the inevitable disruption his or her existence presents to the surrounding ecology.
Now, as a transhumanist / technological progressive, I am extremely concerned about the environment, and do not deny that human influence can have (and has had) detrimental effects on the biosphere. I realize that a certain sort of balance is necessary for plants and animals (including humans) to survive and thrive, and that in some ways we have done grave harm to the Earth, and its lands and our fellow creatures. However, I don't think that this means that we should all commit mass suicide in this generation so that the biosphere can repair itself -- this would be just as illogical as saying that a person should kill themselves following a failed romantic relationship, or that you are obligated to knock down your entire house and start anew because you spilled a bucket of paint in the living room. There's no reason to apply absolutist and punitive responses to what should be a solvable problem.
I'm nearing the end of my third decade on this planet, and just in my lifetime I've seen a greatly increased cognizance of things like global warming, pollution, and waste. I remember recycling being dismissed as some kind of "hippie nonsense" by a lot of people back when I was in elementary school. I remember when people thought global warming was a hoax. I remember hearing quite a bit on the radio about how environmentalism was a threat to business. But now, there are large corporations realizing that they cannot wantonly pollute and that they are going to be held accountable for their effects on the biosphere. I work for one of these large corporations, and there is quite a bit of emphasis on, and encouragement of, environmental responsibility. The voices of those who noticed and pointed out the destruction of the environment are not going unheard, even by large, "impersonal" businesses. Not everyone has come around to an appropriate level of consciousness of these issues, but things are definitely getting better, not worse.
If things are getting better, then that should at least tell us that we as humans have the option, and the potential, to continue to progress technologically while at the same time being conscious of the effects of our influence and taking steps to mitigate harmful ramifications. This might indeed mean that we end up making a few mistakes and then cleaning up, but the solution to living peacefully with the rest of the ecosystem is not to eliminate our species. For all we know, human extinction might have serious and far-reaching detrimental effects that we could not possibly anticipate. Since we're here, and we're alive, the most positive solution seems to be to view our role on the Earth as something like that of a live-in caretaker. Yes, we benefit from being here and use resources to help us survive, but at the same time we think carefully about what we are doing, and why.
A call for technological progress must necessarily include a sense of responsibility. But it makes no sense to assume that, in all areas, we lack the appropriate judgement to exercise our conscious volition in a manner that is wise and beneficial. Just as humanity has the potential for evil and destruction, so do we also have the potential to plant forests and preserve wetlands and endangered animal species. When arguing about what is Natural, and assuming that respecting Nature is tantamount to non-interference, does it not follow that whatever we do consciously might therefore be construed as meddlesome?
As I interpret transhumanism, this philosophy would seem to suggest that not only are we as conscious beings capable of fixing our past mistakes, but also of making the world better and more hospitable to plants, animals, sub-ecosystems, and the overall biosphere. Right now, the world contains more evidence and examples of technological advancement than ever before -- but there are also areas that are far less polluted than previously. More technology, more progress, more knowledge, more exercising of human volition does not inevitably result in more destruction or even greater evidence of our supposed meddling.
Just as transhumanism can be applied in this way to environmental principles -- the idea that not only are we morally obligated to fix past transgressions but to look at means of avoiding similar mistakes in the future and working on ways to create a better and more hospitable earth for plants and animals alike -- it can be applied on the individual level, to individual sentient beings.
For instance, I am in favor of biotechnological and genetic research and the application of this research to the treatment of health problems and the enhancement of human experience. However, I do think that the focus of genetic and biotech should be on providing the opportunity for individuals to make choices in their own lives, not on imposing restrictions on what sorts of people are allowed to be born. As we apply environmental policies in a manner that integrates technology ethically into the biosphere (and recognizes that technology IS a part of the biosphere), we can also continue to learn the mechanisms behind and within living beings to enable individuals to help themselves and have greater control over their destiny than ever before.
Rather than assuming one has to be either a "bio-luddite" or a "eugenicist", it is better to evaluate issues on an individual basis and determine, on ethical grounds, what the best course of action would be. The solution to emerging technology, even risky technology, is not to avoid using it at all -- but rather to use it responsibly and cautiously.
For instance, it is one thing for a living person, who has gained a few years of experience in the world and made some decisions about their life goals, to decide that they'd like some sort of treatment or procedure that would enable him or her to run faster or store memories in a particular way. But it is quite another to attempt to genetically manipulate one's unborn offspring to form neural pathways at a particular rate, or grow to be a certain height, or have a certain skin color. A good cautionary principle in terms of genetic manipulation of any form might be: am I doing this because it will help me achieve my life goals, or because I am afraid or, or pandering to, some form of prejudice?
As I've noted before, I'm particularly concerned about the notion of possibly attempting to cure autism, and some have suggested that genetic research into the origins of autism should be focused on finding ways to deactivate these genes.
If we were successful at doing that, that would be a tragedy because the majority of challenges faced by autistic individuals are, in fact, prejudice-related rather than intrinsic.
A transhuman society that seeks to accept people who choose things like multiple extra limbs, green skin, eyeballs in very interesting places, super-accurate memory, and all sorts of other potential results of individually-defined enhancements (that will certainly necessitate biotechnological and / or genetic technology) must also be prepared to accept people who do not choose enhancements in any form, and people who are obviously autistic or disabled and who do not want to be cured. It doesn't make sense to suggest that people should be free to choose enhancements and that this is an expression of the respect of diversity, but that some things should be compulsory, and human society doesn't have room for some particular disabilities or differences.
Allowing autistic people to be born, and to opt to stay the way we are (for whatever that means) has nothing to do with the first, capital-N definition of Natural. It doesn't mean that we shouldn't "mess with Nature", it simply means that diversity and freedom need to encompass a much larger sphere than some might assume when first hearing about transhuman goals. In some ways, people on the autistic spectrum and with other things that are considered disabilities are actually optimized in certain ways for certain things.
People should most definitely feel free to assess their goals in life and choose post-birth enhancements that they feel would help them achieve these goals (or even things that come down to personal aesthetic preference, and there IS a difference between asserting an aesthetic preference and pandering to prejudice) -- but they should also respect that not everyone has the same goals or preferences. It is also extremely dangerous for an outside agent to start making judgements and assumptions about the subjective experience of another individual (i.e., "You don't know what you're missing!") This leads to the very sort of paternalistic thinking that transhumanism should seek to distance itself from.
After all, how do we know that rats don't pity us for lacking tails?
Right now my two main interests are transhumanism and autism, and in both these spheres of interest there seems to be a crowd of people who are intent on asserting that individuals do not have the right to judge and choose what is best for them. In the autism, or autistic, community, there are people who seek to champion cures and intensive treatments to supposedly eliminate the "tragedy" of the existence of autistic people. In the transhuman community (or at least in the "people who react to transhumanism" community), there are people who seek to suppress and halt efforts to extend the healthy human lifespan -- often on the basis of the assumption that individuals do not have the right to define the length of their own lives, because somehow their lives are going to be "less meaningful" and that people are going to "get bored".
It is striking how similar these arguments are -- the autism "curebies" as they're often referred to, and the anti life-extensionists. Both arguments are the assertion by an outside agent that because some individuals are not following a life path that meets someone's traditional idea of what a life should be, these people should have someone else's restrictions imposed on them, possibly by law. And in noting this similarity of argument, it is important to note that one might expect these groups to be enemies rather than allies, since one is seemingly championing the notion of little-n natural (the curebies, who would see science as an opportunity to "do whatever we can" to eliminate a certain type of person), and the other is thinking in terms of big-N Natural (the anti-life-extensionists, who see aging and death as an essential part of the human condition).
However, these two oppressive groups might not be united in their approach to defining natural -- but they are very closely united in the notion that all humans are somehow obligated to choose a particular kind of life and to be a particular kind of human, lest they risk not being permitted to adopt the mantle of "human" at all.
I still maintain that natural is something applicable to everything we do as human beings -- our consciousness and volition is the direct result of evolution and it is very natural for us to seek ways to increase our autonomy and transcend what we see as limits for our individual selves. And I also maintain that Natural -- when personified and referred to as a proper noun -- is not necessarily synonymous with "good". Aging and eventual death due to the effects of aging may be Natural, but to assert that this big-N Natural property somehow overrides the individual's desire not to die is unethical.
And respecting the rights of autistic people to exist as autistic people is not "good because it is Natural" but rather, good because it is ethical. Regardless of how a person defines natural and whether Nature is personified or viewed as an impersonal phenomenological force, it is clear that no definition is sufficient to allow us to be lax in determining the ethics of a situation.
Responsible transhumanism and technological progressive thought and policy seeks to consider cases of environmental effects and individual-level alteration not on the basis of whether it is natural in some sense, but whether it is good. And this is not easy, or quick, or something that can be figured out over a weekend. Rather it is to be an ongoing process of learning, discovering, discussing, assessing, and monitoring.
Tuesday, May 16, 2006
Superlongevity, Stagnation, and Posthuman Potential
(Crossposted to Betterhumans)
One notion that comes up occasionally in the discussion of radical life extension, or superlongevity, or whatever one might call it, is that of possible "cultural stagnation" or some sort of suppression of evolution. A commenter named Josh on the IEET's posted version of Mark Walker's "Universal Superlongevity -- Is it Inevitable and Is It Good?"paper, suggests that:
"The individual is by design a temporary entity manifested out of inherited diversity to temporarily express possible solutions to currently relevant hindrances to evolution. Technology is just such an example of a solution. A deathless society is not."
The entire fulcrum of this comment seems to be the notion that individuals must necessarily be sacrificed so that some central tenet of nature may be upheld for the "greater good". I question the notion that a maximally "good" and ethical society must condemn people to death, despite the possibility of developing healthy life-extending technologies. Though some people certainly garner meaning and motivation from awareness of their own mortality, this is not true of all people. I do not see why the "death is meaningful" folks should get to decide the lifespans of those who disagree. As far as I am concerned, people who want to die are welcome to do so, but those who would rather stay around longer should have that option.
However, I do think that the "stagnation" argument has some merit to it, in the sense that new generations do tend to produce fresh perspectives, and indeed, aside from a few "dark age" periods in recorded history in various regions of the world, there has been an overall upward trend in terms of potential quality of life.
EDIT: By stating that "I do think that the 'stagnation' argument has some merit to it...", I do not mean to say that I agree with the notion that stagnation is an inevitable consequence of radical life extension and (as the commenter that prompted this post would suggest) such a severe concern that we should not seek to prolong individual lives indefinitely. I DO mean to say that the argument is one that merits a rational rebuttal, rather than an offhand dismissal.
But it is my impression that part of this "quality of life" made possible by evolving ethical realizations and technological advances stems from the tendency of these forms of progress to enhance the individual's ability to lead a self-directed existence. The commenter quoted above seems to think that evolution and death of individuals are inextricably linked, and that if you take death out of the equation, evolution will cease and this will lead to some sort of diminishing of the "greater good".
What is being missed here is the fact that this is only one person's conception of a possible "greater good". Certainly, as technology continues to allow lifespans to increase and human abilities to be enhanced, it seems that cognitive flexibility and the capacity for innovation could very well be one of the targets of enhancement interventions. And there does not seem to be anything inherent in the definition of "evolution" that necessitates the destruction of individuals. Biological evolution involving the diversification of expressed genetic traits through the lives and reproductive cycles of generations that die is only one possible evolutionary scenario. Ideas and philosophies have been said to "evolve" -- however, this does not mean that the ideas of one generation are destroyed to make room for the next. If there is some sort of merit to the preservation of an idea, then it will simply be incorporated into new models of a particular philosophy -- not unchanged, but not destroyed either. It makes little sense to place arbitrary limits on the brains of posthumans in terms of the ability of these brains to enjoy a degree of plasticity and flexibility often considered the exclusive province of the young and new.
I think that the same could be said to be true of people. I imagine that if there were any humans alive today (with intact memories) who were born 500 or 1000 years ago, these people, far from being seen as evidence of "stagnation", would almost certainly be sought after for their ability to offer a long-range perspective. The ability to look at physical phenomena (such as layers of rock and crumbled architecture left by ancient civilizations, ice sheets, etc.) and determine patterns in weather and ecology and social / economic trends has not devalued science -- in fact, an entire branch of science could be said to consist of pattern-analysis. We seek to simulate a long-range perspective such as that which might be held by the very, very long-lived by indirect observation and what amounts to a sort of forensics -- but imagine if this perspective were direct, rather than indirect? It does seem that being able to observe patterns and fluctuations in natural and sociological phenomena over eons might at least be worth trying out.
I do not think there is much danger of a society in which no babies are ever born -- and even if there was, I do not see a pressing ethical problem with perhaps altering our evolutionary path so that it begins to occur through creative means that are nonbiological in nature. There is nothing inherently "good" about a species that has as many babies as possible and makes sure to kill off the parents every few years or so. This may indeed lead to a particular form of biological evolution, but if our own human evolution has led us in a direction that allows for different pathways to the future (not necessarily along purely random biological vectors), then perhaps it is only "natural" that we at least explore these new pathways on the basis of experimentation. When discussing the "greater good", it seems ethically irresponsible to dismiss a particular potential pathway out of hand without even trying it. For all we know, superlongevity could lead to forms of "greater good" we cannot even imagine at present.
Further discussion on this matter would be greatly appreciated, since the "stagnation" argument against radical life extension seems to be nearly as frequently encountered these days as the "overpopulation" argument.
One notion that comes up occasionally in the discussion of radical life extension, or superlongevity, or whatever one might call it, is that of possible "cultural stagnation" or some sort of suppression of evolution. A commenter named Josh on the IEET's posted version of Mark Walker's "Universal Superlongevity -- Is it Inevitable and Is It Good?"paper, suggests that:
"The individual is by design a temporary entity manifested out of inherited diversity to temporarily express possible solutions to currently relevant hindrances to evolution. Technology is just such an example of a solution. A deathless society is not."
The entire fulcrum of this comment seems to be the notion that individuals must necessarily be sacrificed so that some central tenet of nature may be upheld for the "greater good". I question the notion that a maximally "good" and ethical society must condemn people to death, despite the possibility of developing healthy life-extending technologies. Though some people certainly garner meaning and motivation from awareness of their own mortality, this is not true of all people. I do not see why the "death is meaningful" folks should get to decide the lifespans of those who disagree. As far as I am concerned, people who want to die are welcome to do so, but those who would rather stay around longer should have that option.
However, I do think that the "stagnation" argument has some merit to it, in the sense that new generations do tend to produce fresh perspectives, and indeed, aside from a few "dark age" periods in recorded history in various regions of the world, there has been an overall upward trend in terms of potential quality of life.
EDIT: By stating that "I do think that the 'stagnation' argument has some merit to it...", I do not mean to say that I agree with the notion that stagnation is an inevitable consequence of radical life extension and (as the commenter that prompted this post would suggest) such a severe concern that we should not seek to prolong individual lives indefinitely. I DO mean to say that the argument is one that merits a rational rebuttal, rather than an offhand dismissal.
But it is my impression that part of this "quality of life" made possible by evolving ethical realizations and technological advances stems from the tendency of these forms of progress to enhance the individual's ability to lead a self-directed existence. The commenter quoted above seems to think that evolution and death of individuals are inextricably linked, and that if you take death out of the equation, evolution will cease and this will lead to some sort of diminishing of the "greater good".
What is being missed here is the fact that this is only one person's conception of a possible "greater good". Certainly, as technology continues to allow lifespans to increase and human abilities to be enhanced, it seems that cognitive flexibility and the capacity for innovation could very well be one of the targets of enhancement interventions. And there does not seem to be anything inherent in the definition of "evolution" that necessitates the destruction of individuals. Biological evolution involving the diversification of expressed genetic traits through the lives and reproductive cycles of generations that die is only one possible evolutionary scenario. Ideas and philosophies have been said to "evolve" -- however, this does not mean that the ideas of one generation are destroyed to make room for the next. If there is some sort of merit to the preservation of an idea, then it will simply be incorporated into new models of a particular philosophy -- not unchanged, but not destroyed either. It makes little sense to place arbitrary limits on the brains of posthumans in terms of the ability of these brains to enjoy a degree of plasticity and flexibility often considered the exclusive province of the young and new.
I think that the same could be said to be true of people. I imagine that if there were any humans alive today (with intact memories) who were born 500 or 1000 years ago, these people, far from being seen as evidence of "stagnation", would almost certainly be sought after for their ability to offer a long-range perspective. The ability to look at physical phenomena (such as layers of rock and crumbled architecture left by ancient civilizations, ice sheets, etc.) and determine patterns in weather and ecology and social / economic trends has not devalued science -- in fact, an entire branch of science could be said to consist of pattern-analysis. We seek to simulate a long-range perspective such as that which might be held by the very, very long-lived by indirect observation and what amounts to a sort of forensics -- but imagine if this perspective were direct, rather than indirect? It does seem that being able to observe patterns and fluctuations in natural and sociological phenomena over eons might at least be worth trying out.
I do not think there is much danger of a society in which no babies are ever born -- and even if there was, I do not see a pressing ethical problem with perhaps altering our evolutionary path so that it begins to occur through creative means that are nonbiological in nature. There is nothing inherently "good" about a species that has as many babies as possible and makes sure to kill off the parents every few years or so. This may indeed lead to a particular form of biological evolution, but if our own human evolution has led us in a direction that allows for different pathways to the future (not necessarily along purely random biological vectors), then perhaps it is only "natural" that we at least explore these new pathways on the basis of experimentation. When discussing the "greater good", it seems ethically irresponsible to dismiss a particular potential pathway out of hand without even trying it. For all we know, superlongevity could lead to forms of "greater good" we cannot even imagine at present.
Further discussion on this matter would be greatly appreciated, since the "stagnation" argument against radical life extension seems to be nearly as frequently encountered these days as the "overpopulation" argument.
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