One ethics-based argument against radical life extension I've encountered is that the notion of vastly extending one's lifespan is somehow "selfish". The way I see it, wanting to keep living when you're 120 is no more selfish than wanting to continue living when you're 12. I think it's a very, very dangerous line of reasoning that could follow from making the "it's selfish" argument -- basically, this argument assumes that one person is justified in saying when another person is obligated to stop existing.
To illustrate this point, If Bob wants to live forever and will do what he can to achieve it (so long as he remains informed the entire time and does not knowingly or deliberately influence the world in a negative manner), why should Joe be able to say, "Bob, I'm sorry, but there is going to come a point where the best thing you can do for the world is die". I don't think that Joe has any real ability to predict the ramifications of Bob's continued presence. What if Bob is a tireless altruist, working to improve conditions in developing nations? What if Bob is an inspiring poet whose works move people to new heights of understanding of their own condition? How can Joe possibly insist that no matter what Bob is doing, his mere presence beyond a certain age is nothing but a detriment?
I would argue that even if Bob is just an "ordinary" person, living a quiet life in the country, planting his vegetable garden and reading the paper and spending time with his cats, he still has the right to maintain this existence for as long as he would like to. It's not up to Joe to make the decision or judgement as to whether Bob should get to continue living. It's actually more selfish (or at least self-righteous) for Joe to insist that Bob's lifespan should be limited by Joe's philosophy. If Joe wants to die, and feels it's somehow his duty to die, then that is his choice, but it doesn't have to be Bob's choice.
Joe will argue that Bob's continued presence represents an unfair use of resources, that Bob's long life somehow interferes with the future by denying someone else -- who hasn't been born yet -- the chance to exist. The thing is, there is no proof that Bob's life in any way prevents anyone in the future from existing. For all we know, Bob's presence could be granting others MORE opportunities. If Bob (at a robust 200 years of age, perhaps?) tutors his niece in some aspect of art or science and this niece goes on to enrich the lives of others, then couldn't it be argued that Bob's presence -- at age 200 -- actually improved the world, rather than made it worse?
Wanting to live a very long time may be "selfish" in the sense that most human endeavors are selfish in some way -- they allow continued surivival, and opportunities, that may or may not impact the survival and opportunities of others. Driving a car (rather than taking public transit or walking or biking) could be said to be "selfish" because it only behooves the driver's convenience, and inarguably has some sort of environmental impact. Grocery shopping for yourself and not buying anything to donate to a homeless shelter could be considered selfish. Having one's own children rather than adopting (especially when you're concerned about overpopulation) is almost inarguably a selfish act. None of these things are immoral in my estimation, because like it or not, what we call "selfishness" is inseparable from living. So perhaps life extension is selfish, but it's no *more* selfish or likely to result in the breakdown of society or the environment than anything else many people do, (and are not bothered about to any real extent).
Another reason I take issue with the "selfishness" argument as applied to life extension is that it has implications for such things as disability rights. To what extent does a person have to justify their own existence, present or continued? If one claims that people beyond a certain age are obligated to die (because they've somehow used up "their share" of certain resources), then it seems that this involves making a judgement as to what constitutes a contribution to society. What about a disabled person -- someone who is perhaps unable to walk, or cook without assistance, or even move? Is Stephen Hawking using up "too many resources" because he requires a wheelchair, other assistive technology, and staff persons to help him survive? Think of all the people that could be fed, clothed, etc., with the money and time resources it takes to keep this one man alive...does that mean that Dr. Hawking should feel guilty for merely existing, and that the world would be better off without him?
Most people reading this would probably say no, that Dr. Hawking should not feel guilty about his needs because he is making a tremendous contribution to society. But what if he wasn't? What if he was just a disabled man, with no PhD, who needed the same supports to survive but was not a physicist.
Would he then be obligated to die?
Again, I say absolutely not. He would still be a person, and it is impossible (not to mention immoral) for an outside agent to even attempt to judge whether he has a right to continued existence. It sets a very dangerous precedent when one starts using the resource / social contribution model as a rationale for encouraging or disagreeing with the maintenance of people's lives. Lots of people who are outside the visible economy make incredible contributions to human existence, yet are not necessarily recognized or acknowledged for doing so.
There are retired senior citizens who perform volunteer work, which represents a tremendous amount of "free labor", which most certainly benefits the world. There are disabled individuals who cannot hold paying jobs, but who write powerful and passionate essays on human rights and share them with the world through the computer and other means of publication. The point I'm trying to make is that resource use can be a good investment in many cases, and that one needs to be on the lookout for "contributions to society" where one might not expect them, because when contributions are atypical or not subject to direct economic measurement, they can simply "pass under the radar" unless one is looking for them.
I agree that society does benefit from a certain amount of turnover and refreshment of perspectives, and that if everyone alive today magically just Didn't Die (yet we kept reproducing at the same ridiculous rate) there would be serious problems...but still, this doesn't convince me that it's unduly selfish to live or keep living. People are often called "selfish" if they commit suicide, and yet people are also called "selfish" when they endeavor not to die at all. One's presence, or absence, can affect the world (and the Universe) in completely unpredictable ways. Rather than assigning the "selfish" moniker to life-extensionists, perhaps it would be more rational to just keep applying it to suicides, since the argument used to justify the labeling here is that those who off themselves are denying the world of their contributions.
It's evident that this reasoning could just go round and round and round.
Therefore, it seems that the MOST pertinent thing to do is not worry so much about whether other people are doing things, or holding philosophies, that you consider "selfish". Rather, each person should be free to pursue a life that they are suited for, and work toward goals that are meaningful for them. Whether they look impressive to anyone else or not.
It's all well and good to talk about the "greater social justice", but if your favorite relative was 95 years old, in some sort of terrible pain, and DID NOT want to die, I can't imagine anyone here would sit there and say, "Well, Grandma, too bad...you've had your chance to live, and now you need to get out of the way so your presence doesn't somehow deny arbitrary future people the right to exist." I think it would be sick and reprehensible to sit there trying to convince such a person that they shouldn't desire to live any longer, or withhold medical treatment from them on the basis that they were "using up resources".
After all, it is one thing to say on the statistical, impersonal level, "Well, a certain number of people have to die every year in order to maintain the social order and natural equilibrium". It's quite another to say that someone's relative, or YOUR relative, "deserves" to die. Even if they'd rather not. Even if they haven't finished experiencing things and forming connections between thoughts, etc. Maybe a lot of people just accept death, but those that do not should NOT be obligated to experience decline and suffering. And they shouldn't be made to feel guilty for existing, regardless of how old they are.
6 comments:
The way things are going now, the defacto way of determining your worth to society is the amount of money you have. The recent medical advance of growing a replacement bladder foretells growing replacement organs. Unfortunately, the cost is several hundred thousand dollars, and the bladder is a very simple organ.
Unless the USA decides to shift far away from the present right wing and implement universal health care, your extreme longevity potential will depend mainly on how rich you are.
nerdinium:
The fact that one's right to live is currently so tied into economic matters definitely worries me. I do think that the first people to break the "age ceiling" through technology will be at least somewhat well-off.
Resources already aren't getting where they are most needed in our present economic system -- here in the USA, or anywhere in the world. I don't think this can be "blamed" on right wing, left wing, whatever politics you can think of...it's more a matter of attitudes that run much deeper.
I am ashamed to live in a society (meaning a world society) where we find articles like this one on premature babies:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2104205,00.html
Even in a nation (Britain) where they actually HAVE something approaching universal health care, there is still an attitide among some that people are only worthy of existence so long as they are using a predetermined "share" of resources.
These babies aren't "bed blockers", they are human beings. And senior citizens aren't a "waste of resources", no matter how old they are.
I agree 'bed blockers' is a disturbing concept. The word 'blockers' implies conscious intent to block others, and is reminiscent of eugenics propaganda. Saving human beings is worthy of great effort, but there are physical resource limits on the effort individuals and society can expend on any one thing, and resouce limits are closer to the actual concepts involved.
I know you don't drive, so I don't know if you have ever had the experience of having to give up on repairing something important to you. I could have kept repairing my first car indefinitely, but it was costing me huge amounts of my time and money by not junking the car and buying a new one. I'm not saying that people are disposable, only that physical machines (of which the body is one) do reach the point where the effort to keep them going can overwhelm the rest of your life. There is a cost/benefit ratio that is enforced if not by quality of life, then by the limits of physical resources.
Until consciousness can be moved to a computer and copied digitally, there is a limit to the amount of effort that can be expended to repair biological systems, even if that biological system (person) is intriniscally valuable. That limited amount of effort (money basically) that society has created must be divided among all the needs of society.
On a different note, I like the fiction of Corey Doctorow, and one of his works "Down and out in the Magic Kingdom" deals with life after technological advances have made death almost unknown, and explores what that would do to society. Have you read it?
http://craphound.com/down/download.php
This one passage brought up a disturbing thought:
"You go to a backup kiosk and you decant a copy of yourself into a big storage cloud, and if you die -- or even if you have a bad hangover, hell, why not -- you have a force-grown clone, and you decant the consciousness into it and you off yourself."
I'm not a good player of first-person-shooter video games, and as a result, before I go into any new areas, I make a restore point and start new from there if I don't do well in the game. How would that influence life if you could erase unpleasant events from your mind by killing yourself, and restoring from an earlier backup (an extreme version of "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind" http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0338013/)?
Nerdinium -
I completely agree about the eugenics angle, and in my mind, life extension and things like disability rights are inseparable.
You bring up an important point here:
physical machines (of which the body is one) do reach the point where the effort to keep them going can overwhelm the rest of your life. There is a cost/benefit ratio that is enforced if not by quality of life, then by the limits of physical resources.
I think that if true life-extension technology does develop, it will necessarily have to be somewhat self-sustaining and not in need of huge amounts of energy to keep it (whatever "it" is) going.
Perhaps the first few people who manage to break out of their expected lifespan will require heroic efforts to keep them alive for a few years, however, after this I anticipate something more akin to a "reprogramming" of the body's ability to maintain itself.
To use your car analogy, it would be like performing some sort of procedure on the car (application of nanomachines, perhaps?) that would enable parts to respond to wear on an ongoing basis. Maybe repair at the molecular level? (I realize I'm getting into science fiction here, but I don't see why this sort of scenario wouldn't be possible someday given that I see no need to place arbitrary limits on future technology)
Nevertheless, to be entirely realistic, I am not "banking" on necessarily benefitting from escape velocity myself, at least not to the point where something like cryonics might not become necessary for a while.
I am certainly monitoring the progress of technology and knowledge of biology and could presumably become more optimistic at some point, and I'm not giving up and "accepting" my own death -- ever -- but as of right now I see no clear, direct path to the distant future that doesn't require a radical change in form.
I think that biological systems can certainly be "stretched" in terms of their ability to support a conscious brain, but at some point I think that the substrate will just (as you say) become too difficult to maintain. Or at the very least, we still know far too little about how to maintain and regenerate the substrate.
That is the opinion I'm taking until I see additional evidence that medical science is progressing faster than I think it is.
For now, I'm trying to get used to the idea of someday having a body that isn't human, or that is just radically different, or even having no body for a time.
It's actually not very difficult for me to conceive of such an existence -- I'd take anything over permanent oblivion, after all! This doesn't mean I'm completely convinced I'm going to have to get myself frozen...all it means is that I don't see any sort of techno-rapture at hand, especially when so many people in the world still let their lives and philosophies be determined by such things as religion or a "duty to die".
My main concern is the maintenance of information. The way I see it, people ARE information, and that consciousness is an emergent property of the information stored in the neural connections of the brain. Therefore, though maintaining the body can certainly increase the chances of having a brain that is easier to take care of in one's old age, I am primarily concerned with maintaining patterns of awareness, memories, and consciousness. It is much easier to preserve a brain than it is to preserve an entire body -- the only concern then would be providing a proper sensory interface for that brain, because consciousness in a vaccuum without the ability to gain new data would be little better than a hard drive. I think that bodily preservation or bodily repair will simply serve as a "bridge" to existence in some sort of other substrate.
Of course, if I'm wrong about all this, great -- it would certainly be simpler to keep human form, and not have to worry about getting "lost in transit".
Oh...and I still need to do a lot of thinking / research on the matter of transferring "consciousness" from a brain into something else -- because this gives rise to the notion of making copies of a person. What I am interested in is maintaining a sense of continuity, and I do not know how that would work if a person was "copied" into a different substrate. I just wonder where, exactly, the "sense of self" lies. Yes, I think this sense is an emergent property of neural connections, but I don't know what would happen if one tried to replicate those same connections -- obviously I couldn't be self-aware at different points in space simultaneously.
"obviously I couldn't be self-aware at different points in space simultaneously."
Why not? Science fiction has many stories about people making copies of themselves. It would be interesting to say the least to meet a copy of yourself.
To make optimal use of being able to live more than once in the same time period some kind of memory transfer between the copies would be necessary so that all copies would have similar information, otherwise which copy would you choose to propagate into the future? Computerizing consciousness would make this easy.
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